

#### Who am I?

- Niels Tanis
- Sr. Principal Security Researcher
  - Background .NET Development, Pentesting/ethical hacking, and software security consultancy
  - Research on static analysis for .NET apps
  - Enjoying Rust!
- Microsoft MVP Developer Technologies



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#### Agenda

- Introduction
- •WebAssembly 101
- Running on WebAssembly
- •Extending with WebAssembly
- •Securing with WebAssembly
- Conclusion
- •Q&A



https://webassembly.org/



# WebAssembly - AutoCAD



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https://medium.com/disney-streaming/introducing-the-disney-application-development-kit-adk-ad85ca139073

https://www.amazon.science/blog/how-prime-video-updates-its-app-for-more-than-8-000-device-types



https://www.infoq.com/presentations/prime-video-rust/



https://hacks.mozilla.org/2017/02/creating-and-working-with-webassembly-modules/ https://webassembly.org/



#### WebAssembly Design

- •Be fast, efficient, and portable
  - Executed in near-native speed across different platforms
- •Be readable and debuggable
  - In low-level bytecode but also human readable
- Keep secure
  - Run on sandboxed execution environment
- Don't break the web • Ensure backwards compatibility



#### WebAssembly

- •Binary instruction format for stack-based virtual machine similar to .NET CLR running MSIL or JVM running bytecode
- •Designed as a portable compilation target
- •The security model of WebAssembly:
  - •Protect users from buggy or malicious modules
  - Provide developers with useful primitives and mitigations for developing safe applications

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https://hacks.mozilla.org/2017/02/creating-and-working-with-webassembly-modules/ https://webassembly.org/



#### WebAssembly Type System

•WebAssembly's type only supports:

- •i32 (32-bit integer)
- •i64 (64-bit integer)
- •f32 (32-bit float)
- •f64 (64-bit float)
- •No strings, no objects, no complex data types.
- •Basic operations on numerical values.

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#### WebAssembly Stack Based VM

•In a stack-based VM, operations primarily manipulate a last-in-first-out (LIFO) stack of values, rather than working with named registers as in register-based architectures.



#### WebAssembly Stack Based VM

- •WebAssembly maintains an operand stack during execution:
  - •Values are pushed onto the stack by instructions
  - •Operations pop their operands from the stack
  - •Results are pushed back onto the stack
  - •The stack is separate from linear memory and is not directly accessible

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#### Code some WebAssembly



Let's create some WAT! <u>http://github.com/nielstanis/secappdev25wasm</u>







#### WebAssembly Memory

- Isolated per WASM module
- •A contiguous, mutable array of uninterpreted bytes







### Code some WebAssembly

Let's work with some Memory!







## WebAssembly Control-Flow Integrity

- •Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) ensures that program execution follows only valid paths as defined by the program's source code.
- •In traditional native code, attackers can exploit memory vulnerabilities to hijack execution flow:
  - •Redirecting it to malicious code
  - •Chaining together existing code fragments in unintended ways (like Return-Oriented Programming attacks).

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# CFI Example

	<pre>int number = Convert.ToInt32(Console.ReadLine());</pre>
	<pre>Console.WriteLine(\$"Number {number}");</pre>
	if (number>5)
	{
	<pre>Console.WriteLine("Number is larger than 5");</pre>
	}
	else
	{
	<pre>Console.WriteLine("Number is smaller than 5");</pre>
	}
	<pre>Console.WriteLine("Done!");</pre>
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CFI Example	
int numbe Console.W if (numbe	<pre>r = Convert.ToInt32(Console.ReadLine()); riteLine(\$"Number {number}"); r&gt;5)</pre>
Console.WriteLine("Numb	er is larger than 5");
	Console.WriteLine("Number is smaller than 5"); Console.WriteLine("Done!");
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# •No arbitrary jump instructions (no goto, jmr

- •No arbitrary jump instructions (no goto, jmp or equivalent)
- •All branches have explicit, validated targets within the same function
- •No ability to jump to arbitrary memory addresses
- •All control flow is validated before execution

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### **CFI:** Indirect Calls

- •Function table entries are validated at module instantiation
- •Runtime checks ensure the target index is within table bounds
- •Runtime type checking ensures the called function matches the expected signature
- •The table is protected from direct memory manipulation

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### Code some WebAssembly



Indirect calling!











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### CFI: Separation of Code and Data

- •Code sections cannot be modified at runtime
- •Linear memory (accessible data) cannot contain executable code
- •No instruction exists to convert data to code No selfmodifying code capabilities



https://rlbox.dev/ https://hacks.mozilla.org/2020/02/securing-firefox-with-webassembly/



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- •RLBox considers all values that originate in the sandbox as untrusted and "taints" them.
- •Tainted values are essentially opaque values that cannot be used directly by the application code.
- •RLBox's type system marks all data coming out of the sandbox as "tainted" and ensures, through compiler errors, that developers sanitize potentially unsafe data before using it.

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**RLBox in Firefox** 





#### **RLBox in Firefox**

•RLBox is currently deployed in Firefox to isolate five different modules:

- Graphite Font rendering engine Firefox 95
- Hunspell Spell checker Firefox 95
- Ogg Multimedia container format Firefox95
- Expat XML parser Firefox 96
- Woff2 Web font compression format Firefox 96

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Diagram:

https://github.com/itowlson/wasmday22/blob/main/slides/Wasm%20Interfaces%20a nd%20.NET.pptx



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# Blazor WebAssembly







https://cheerpj.com/docs/explanation/architecture https://cheerpjdemos.leaningtech.com/PHETDemos.html#demo



Diagram:

https://github.com/itowlson/wasmday22/blob/main/slides/Wasm%20Interfaces%20a nd%20.NET.pptx


## WebAssembly System Interface WASI

- Introduced in March 2019 by Bytecode Alliance
- •WasmTime implementation as reference
- •POSIX inspired, engine-independent, non-Web system-oriented API for WebAssembly

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- Strong sandbox with Capability Based Security
- •Right now, supports e.g. FileSystem actions, Sockets, CLI and HTTP at version 0.2

WebAssembly System Interface WASI

- •Future support for promise/async and streams
- •Anyone recall .NET Standard? 🙂

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## Docker vs WASM & WASI





## Docker vs WASM & WASI



Docker & WASM	
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Introducing the Docker+Wasm Technical Preview	Container process
Michael IRWIN Oct 24 2022	Let's look at an example! After installing the preview, we can run the following command to start an example Wasm application:
The Technical Preview of Docker+Waam is now available! Waam has been producing a lot of buzz recently, and this feature will make it easier for you to quickly build applications targeting Waam runtimes.	docter rum -dp 8888;8880 —name-wasm-example —runtime-io.containerd.wasmedge.vl = -platform-wasi/wasml2 michaelindin244/wasm-example
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# WebAssembly System Interface WASI





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# Experimental WASI SDK for .NET





https://github.com/SteveSandersonMS/dotnet-wasi-sdk

.NET 8 WA	SI-Experimental
f x in	Control of the con
	Console.WriteLine("Hello, WASI Console!");

https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/issues/65895 https://github.com/SteveSandersonMS/dotnet-wasi-sdk

https://devblogs.microsoft.com/dotnet/extending-web-assembly-to-the-cloud/



## Extending .NET with WASM

- •WasmTime.NET NuGet package
- •Can run WASM inside of any .NET application
- •Extend with Rust based WASM module
- •Limit capabilities
- •Demo time!

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https://xkcd.com/2166/



https://enarx.dev/



### Enarx Threat Model

- •Don't trust the host
- •Don't trust the host owner
- •Don't trust the host operator
- •Hardware cryptographically verified
- •Software audited and cryptographically verified





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#### Enarx

#### • Each execution:

- Attestation: Enarx checks that the host to which you're planning to deploy is a genuine TEE instance.
- Packaging: Once the attestation is complete and the TEE instance verified, the Enarx management component encrypts the application, along with any required data.
- Provisioning: Enarx then sends the application and data along to the host for execution in the Enarx Keep.
- •TEE provides: Data Confidentiality, Data Integrity, Code Integrity

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## Project Hyperlight



## DotNetIsolator & Project Hyperlight





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https://opensource.microsoft.com/blog/2025/03/26/hyperlight-wasm-fast-secure-and-os-free/















WebAssem	Oly Nano-Process 1. Sandboxing	
	Here, you can use getrandom but to ensure everyone's safety, that's the only one I'm giving you sandboxing (getrandom etrandom etrandom write	
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## WebAssembly Nano-Process

Aemory model
 Control of the second seco



## WebAssembly Nano-Process



WebAssembly Nano-Pr	ocess
4. WebAssembly System Interface	
	an API with a fine-grained permission model
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WebAssem	bly Nano-Process
	5. The missing link
	You get the keys to the open syscall and the uploads directory and you get the key for the getrandom syscall
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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tAACYA1Mwv4



https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mkkYNw8gTQg&t=1121s



https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mkkYNw8gTQg&t=1121s



## WASI Preview 2 (0.2)

sunfishcode's blog A blog by sunfishcode	
WASI Preview 2 Launched	
Posted on January 25, 2024	
The WASI Subgroup has just voted to launch WASI Preview 2! This blog post is a brief look at the present, past, and future of WASI.	a
The present	
The Subgroup voted to launch Preview 2!	
This is a major milestone! We made it! At the same time, the journey is only just beginning. But let's talk this moment to step back and look at what this means.	
Most immediately, what this means is that the WASI Subgroup officially says that the Previou 2 ABIs are stable. There is still a lat more to do in writing more	at
documentation, more tests, more toolchains, more implementations, and there a	are
way, rather than a destination in itself.	the
It also means that WASI is now officially based on the Wasm component model, which makes it cross-language and virtualizable. Figuring out what a component model even is, designing at, implementing it, and building APIs using it has been	Nt a

WASI 0.3			
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← → C WASL.dev	O B wasi.dev/roadmap	ප්සය ලස්සාව GitHub 🗹	(L)
Introduction Interdaces Resources Contribute Roadmap	WASI version         Date           0.2.1         2024-08-01           0.2.2         2024-10-03           0.2.3         2024-12-06           0.2.4         2025-02-06           0.2.5         2026-04-03           The release train for WASI 0.2 will end following the release of WASI 0.2 will end following the	WAS 0.2 viewees Upcoming WAS 33 release Project Treative	
SecAppDev	Upcoming WASI 0.3 releases At this time, VK3 0.3 o previews are expected in August 2025 and around November 2025. Please see the presentation and notes for meeting for more information. W49 10.30 will add antire sampre support to the Component Mod interfaces to take advantage of native async.	completion is expected in the May 2025 WASI 50 if and refactor WASI 0.2 @niels.fennec.dev	) Dinielstanis@infosec.exchange

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mkkYNw8gTQg&t=1121s

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	WasmC	omponent.Sdk				Languages			
	An experiment support for WI	al package to simplify building T files.	g WASI preview 2 components u	using .NET, including early		• C# 100.0%			
	The build output	t is fully AOT compiled and is I	known to work in recent versions	of wasmtime and WAMR.					
	Purpose								
_	This is to simpl	fy experimentation and prototy	rping.						
	Without this pa exports, there a together. Just f how to get star	ckage, if you wanted to build a re about 5 different tools you'd iguring out which versions of e ted would be very painful.	WASI preview 2 component with d need to discover, download, co ach are compatible with the othe	.NET, including using WIT imp nfigure, and manually chain rs is a big challenge. Working o	orts/ out				
	With this packa	ge, you can add one NuGet ref	erence and then get on with you	r experiments.					

https://github.com/SteveSandersonMS/wasm-component-sdk/

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https://github.com/bytecodealliance/componentize-dotnet/

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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tAACYA1Mwv4


## Runtimes and Security

- •Most security research published focusses on correctness of WASM runtimes/VM's
- •Bytecode Alliance Blogpost:
  - "Security and Correctness in Wasmtime"
  - •Written in Rust  $\rightarrow$  Using all it's LangSec features
  - Continues Fuzzing & formal verification
  - Security process & vulnerability disclosure

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https://bytecodealliance.org/articles/security-and-correctness-in-wasmtime



https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FFPoOR\_5urw



## WebAssembly Lineair Memory

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gangsan Lindin Stand Program Participate Sponsors about Lindin Standsum	
Everything Old is New Again: Binary S	ecurity of
WebAssembly	,
uthors: aniel Lehmann, University of Stuttgort; Johannes Kinder, Bundeswehr University Munich; Michael P	radel, University of Stuttgart
bstract: HebAssembly is an increasingly popular compilation target designed to run code in browsers an HebAssembly is an increasingly popular compilation target designed to run code in browsers an unerabilities in WebAssembly binaries. In this paper, we analyze to what extent vulnerabilities indireabilities in webAssembly binaries. In this paper, we analyze to what extent vulnerabilities and the code. We find that many classic vulnerabilities which, due to common mitigat ompletely exposed in WebAssembly. Moreover, WebAssembly enables unique attacks, such as c age using a stack overflow. We present a set of attack primitives that enable an attacker (i) to w ii) to trigger unexpected behavior by diverting control flow or manipulating the host environmer plications along with complete end-co-end exploix, which cover three WebAssembly platforms FCC PU programs compiled to WebAssembly shows that our attack primitives that envirotection were lack of than y security in webAssembly. How dows that our attack primitives are likely to be fra- sens lack of than y security in webAssembly. We discuss potential portection mechanisms t	d on other platforms safely and securely, by strictly in memory-unsafe source languages can translate to re exploitable im WebAssembby binaries, and how this tions, are no longer exploitable in native binaries, are werwriting supposedly constant data or manipulating the readitrary memory. (i) to overwrite sensitive data, and nt. We provide a set of vulnerable proof-of-concept s. A mempirical risk assessment on real-word binaries and easible in practice. Overall, our findings show a perhaps to mitigate the resulting risks.

https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity20/presentation/lehmann



https://arxiv.org/pdf/2410.17925v1



## Conclusion

- •WebAssembly has a lot of potential to be used to run, extend, and secure your applications!
- Its as secure as the WebAssembly runtime implementation!
- •WASI 0.2 big milestone; tooling in progress!
- •WASI 0.3 due in August 2025
- Cloud Native WebAssembly

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## Merci! Bedankt! Thanks!

- •https://github.com/nielstanis/secappdev25wasm
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- https://blog.fennec.dev

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