

# AppSec is Changing

SecAppDev 2024




## Erlend Oftedal

- Security researcher @ Crosspoint Labs
- Software Developer and Security Engineer/Architect/Tester for 20 years
- Builds and maintains free open source security tools such as [retire.js](#)
- [OWASP Oslo chapter lead](#)
- [@webtonull](#)

## Disclaimer

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# Medieval AppSec

Attackers focused on network, servers, and browsers



Little or no understanding of the need for AppSec

"Not my job"





"The department of no"





No management buy-in




Ad-hoc processes

"Pen test driven security"



No or unclear security requirements

No or unclear regulations





Unsung heroes -  
Highly dependant on people





## Intermission: XSS Worms


"But most of all, Samy is my hero"





# The age of Dev(Sec)Ops







“ *Security testing can be automated, but true security assurance cannot be. The only way that we can free up enough cycles to have security assurance, is to automate all the things that can be.*

- Gene Kim

"Shift Left"

# CI/CD and pipelines




# Security Test Automation and Cadence

# Secure Software Development Lifecycle (SDLC)



## Security Champions and Security Engineers



Dependency management / Software Composition Analysis (SCA)

Alert fatigue





AppSec 2024


"(Application) Security is about making **only** the *expected* thing possible"



Developers are more involved in security tool selection




Application attacks are getting more complex





## Accountability and Legislation

- ▶ Executive Order 14028 - Improving the Nation's Cybersecurity
- ▶ Cyber Resilience Act
- ▶ NIS2



# Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) and SBOM management



# Software Supply Chain Security (SSCS)





## Provenance



Built and signed on

**GitHub Actions**

[View build summary.](#)

**Source Commit** [github.com/RetireJS/retire.js@d382c8c](https://github.com/RetireJS/retire.js@d382c8c)

**Build File** [.github/workflows/publish.yml](https://github.com/RetireJS/retire.js/blob/main/.github/workflows/publish.yml)

**Public Ledger** [Transparency log entry.](#)

[Share feedback](#)

<https://www.npmjs.com/package/retire>

# Posture Management



# Cloud Security Posture Management (CSPM)

```
graph LR; A((Collect cloud infrastructure data)) --> B((Analyze and visualize)); B --> C((Alert and remediate));
```

Collect cloud  
infrastructure  
data

Analyze and  
visualize

Alert and  
remediate

# Kubernetes Security Posture Management (KSPM)

Collect k8s and  
container config

Analyze and  
visualize

Alert and  
remediate

# Developer/Repository Security Posture Management





# Application Security Posture Management (ASPM)

```
graph LR; A((Collect scan results)) --> B((Analyze, Correlate, and Trace)); B --> C((Report and Prioritize));
```

Collect scan  
results

Analyze,  
Correlate, and  
Trace

Report and  
Prioritize

What's next

## STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 3.3: SHIFT LIABILITY FOR INSECURE SOFTWARE PRODUCTS AND SERVICES

Markets impose inadequate costs on—and often reward—those entities that introduce vulnerable products or services into our digital ecosystem. Too many vendors ignore best practices for secure development, ship products with insecure default configurations or known vulnerabilities, and integrate third-party software of unvetted or unknown provenance. **Software makers are able to leverage their market position to fully disclaim liability** by contract, further **reducing their incentive to follow secure-by-design principles** or perform pre-release testing. **Poor software security greatly increases systemic risk** across the digital ecosystem and leave American citizens bearing the ultimate cost.

We must begin to shift liability onto those entities that fail to take reasonable precautions to secure their software while recognizing that even the most advanced software security programs cannot prevent all vulnerabilities. **Companies that make software** must have the freedom to innovate, but they **must also be held liable when they fail** to live up to the duty...

## The CISA **Secure by Design** pledge

- ▶ Increase use of **Multi-factor Authentication**
- ▶ Reduce use of **default passwords**
- ▶ **Reducing entire classes of vulnerabilities** including - but not limited to - SQL-injection, Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) and memory management issues.
- ▶ Increase installation of **Security patches**
- ▶ Publish a **Vulnerability disclosure policy**
- ▶ Accurate reporting of **CVEs**
- ▶ Increase ability for customers to gather **Evidence of intrusions**

AI






## Detecting vulnerabilities with AI

## Detecting misconfigurations with AI

## Detecting attacks with AI

## Fixing code with AI



# AppSec for AI applications





## AI doing the wrong thing




## In summary




The focus on  
AppSec is  
increasing



The AppSec  
culture is  
maturing



Interesting  
times ahead and  
still a lot to learn





Thank you!

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