



MANICODE
SECURE CODING EDUCATION

The OWASP Top Ten 2021-2022

OWASP Top 10 – 2021 Learning Objectives



In this Course you will Learn:

What is OWASP – What are the OWASP Top 10 Risks

For Each of OWASP Top 10 – 2021

Key Concepts and Definition

Challenges with this Risk


Examples – Good & Bad Code in Pseudocode

Best Protection Strategies



Former OWASP Global Board Member

- 20+ years of software development experience
- Author – *"Iron-Clad Java, Building Secure Web Applications"*
 - McGraw-Hill/Oracle-Press
- OWASP Project Leader
 - Cheat Sheet Series
 - Java Encoder / HTML Sanitizer
 - Application Security Verification Standard





What is the OWASP Top Ten?



What is OWASP?

The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP):

Is a web application security online community – anyone can join

Produces freely-available methods, articles, tools

Is lead by the non-profit OWASP Foundation

- Established as a 501(c) 3 in the US in 2004
- Established as OWASP Europe VZW in Belgium in 2011
- Has a number of key projects and chapters around the world



Brief History of the OWASP Top 10

Is a Flagship Project, first published in 2003

Aims to raise awareness on critical application security risks

Ranks the top 10 application security risks in its year of publication

OWASP Top 10 - 2021 is based on data from over 40 organizations

Previous editions include 2017, 2010, 2007

Is referenced in many standards, such as

- MITRE
- Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA-STIG)
- PCI DSS
- Federal Trade Commission (FTC)



Making the OWASP Top 10 – 2021



Data call – Identifies 8 of the 10 risks

- Organizations asked to contribute their vulnerability data
- Web application vulnerabilities found in various processes



Industry survey – identifies remaining 2 of the 10

- Allows information security practitioners in the front lines to vote
- Catches highest risks that might not be represented in the data

OWASP Top Ten 2021

**A1: Broken
Access
Control**

**A2:
Cryptographic
Failures**

A3: Injection

**A4: Insecure
Design**

**A5: Security
Configuration**

**A6: Vulnerable
and Outdated
Components**

**A7: Identity &
Authentication
Failures**

**A8: Software
and Data
Integrity
Failure**

**A9: Security
Logging and
Monitoring
Failures**

**A10: Server
Side Request
Forgery**



Learning the OWASP Top 10 – 2021

- Key Concepts – Information security terms you need to know
- Definition – The definition using the concepts previously introduced
- Challenges – The root causes behind this risk
- Example – Pseudocode of good example and bad example
- Best Protection Strategies – How to best prevent this risk



Here are our recommendations for when it is appropriate to use the OWASP Top 10:

Use Case	OWASP Top 10 2021	OWASP Application Security Verification Standard
Awareness	Yes	
Training	Entry level	Comprehensive
Design and architecture	Occasionally	Yes
Coding standard	Bare minimum	Yes
Secure Code review	Bare minimum	Yes
Peer review checklist	Bare minimum	Yes
Unit testing	Occasionally	Yes
Integration testing	Occasionally	Yes
Penetration testing	Bare minimum	Yes
Tool support	Bare minimum	Yes
Secure Supply Chain	Occasionally	Yes



A1: Broken Access Control



A01:2021-Broken Access Control moves up from the fifth position; 94% of applications were tested for some form of broken access control. The 34 Common Weakness Enumerations (CWEs) mapped to Broken Access Control had more occurrences in applications than any other category.

<https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/>



2 Key Concepts for A01:2021 – Broken Access Control

Access Control

- Selectively restricting access
- Features or data require permission to access

Authorization

- Permission to access certain features or data is called authorization



Definition

A01:2021 – Broken Access Control




- **Users of the application can operate outside their defined permissions**
- **This typically leads to unauthorized information or features being processed**
- **Violation of the principle of least privilege or least authority**



Example A01:2021 – Broken Access Control

```
adminReport(param) {  
  if (user.isRole("USER"), param)  
  {  
    //execute admin activity on param  
  }  
}
```

```
adminReport(param) {  
  if (user.isAuthorized("ADMIN"), param)  
  {  
    //execute admin activity on param  
  }  
}
```

 Good code  Bad code  User defined input



Indirect Object References (IDOR)

Horizontal Access Control

Example Feature

<https://mail.example.com/message/2356342>

This SQL would be vulnerable to tampering

```
select id,data from messages where messageid = 2356342
```

Ensure the owner is referenced in the query!

```
select id,data from messages m where m.id = :one AND (m.owner_id = :two or m.recipient_id = :two)
```

```
:one = 2356342
```

```
:two = <userid_from_session_or_jwt>
```




Broken Access Control Challenges

- **Access Control is** difficult to test from automated tools. Your scanning tools **are rarely aware of your custom access control policies.**
- **Access Control is** difficult for developers to build. Our frameworks **rarely provide detailed access control functionality.**



Best Protection Strategies

A01:2021 – Broken Access Control

Design access control so all requests must be authorized

Enforce access by activity and only for valid workflow paths, never by role

Build a centralized access control mechanism

Assign permissions to users in the context of data

Refuse access by default, fail securely



Best Practice: Code to the Activity (or Permission)



```
← → ↻ view-source  
  
if (user.hasAccess(Feature.ARTICLE_EDIT))  
{  
    //execute activity  
}
```

Code it once, never needs to change again

Implies policy is centralized in some way

Implies policy is persisted in some way

Requires more design/work up front to get right



Access Control Key Concepts I

- **Enforce** access control by an activity or feature, not the role
- **Implement data-contextual access control** to assign permissions to application users in the context of specific data items for horizontal access control requirements
- **Build** a centralized access control mechanism
- **Design** access control so all requests must be authorized



Access Control Key Concepts II

- **Deny** by default, fail securely
- **Server-side trusted data** should drive access control policy decisions
- Be able to change a users entitlements **in real time**
- **Build grouping capability** for users and permissions
- **Build admin screens first** to manage access control policy data



ASVS 4.0.3 Access Control Requirements

<https://github.com/OWASP/ASVS/blob/master/4.0/en/0x12-V4-Access-Control.md>



V4.1 General Access Control Design

#	Description	L1	L2	L3	CWE
4.1.1	Verify that the application enforces access control rules on a trusted service layer, especially if client-side access control is present and could be bypassed.	✓	✓	✓	602
4.1.2	Verify that all user and data attributes and policy information used by access controls cannot be manipulated by end users unless specifically authorized.	✓	✓	✓	639
4.1.3	Verify that the principle of least privilege exists - users should only be able to access functions, data files, URLs, controllers, services, and other resources, for which they possess specific authorization. This implies protection against spoofing and elevation of privilege. (C7)	✓	✓	✓	285
4.1.4	[DELETED, DUPLICATE OF 4.1.3]				
4.1.5	Verify that access controls fail securely including when an exception occurs. (C10)	✓	✓	✓	285

<https://github.com/OWASP/ASVS/blob/master/4.0/en/0x12-V4-Access-Control.md>



V4.2 Operation Level Access Control

#	Description	L1	L2	L3	CWE
4.2.1	Verify that sensitive data and APIs are protected against Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) attacks targeting creation, reading, updating and deletion of records, such as creating or updating someone else's record, viewing everyone's records, or deleting all records.	✓	✓	✓	639
4.2.2	Verify that the application or framework enforces a strong anti-CSRF mechanism to protect authenticated functionality, and effective anti-automation or anti-CSRF protects unauthenticated functionality.	✓	✓	✓	352

V4.3 Other Access Control Considerations

#	Description	L1	L2	L3	CWE
4.3.1	Verify administrative interfaces use appropriate multi-factor authentication to prevent unauthorized use.	✓	✓	✓	419
4.3.2	Verify that directory browsing is disabled unless deliberately desired. Additionally, applications should not allow discovery or disclosure of file or directory metadata, such as Thumbs.db, .DS_Store, .git or .svn folders.	✓	✓	✓	548
4.3.3	Verify the application has additional authorization (such as step up or adaptive authentication) for lower value systems, and / or segregation of duties for high value applications to enforce anti-fraud controls as per the risk of application and past fraud.		✓	✓	732



■ CAUTION

- Good access control is **hard to add to an application late in the lifecycle**

■ VERIFY

- Automated security tools are poor at verifying access control vulnerabilities since tools are not aware of your access control policy

■ GUIDANCE

- https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Authorization_Cheat_Sheet.html
- <http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/specialpublications/NIST.sp.800-162.pdf>
- <https://github.com/OWASP/ASVS/blob/master/4.0/en/0x12-V4-Access-Control.md>

Summary

A01:2021 – Broken Access Control

Concept

Access Control

- Selectively restricting access
- Features or data require permission to access

Authorization

- Permission to access certain features or data is called authorization

Definition

Users of the application can operate outside their defined permissions

This typically leads to unauthorized information being processed

Violation of the principle of need to know

Example

- `user.isRole("USER")`
- `user.isAuthorized("ADMIN")`

Best Protection Strategies

Design access control so all requests must be authorized

Enforce access by activity and only for valid workflow paths, never by role

Build a centralized access control mechanism


Assign permissions to users in the context of data

Refuse access by default, fail securely

Good code Bad code User defined input



A2: Cryptographic Failure



A02:2021-Cryptographic Failures shifts up one position to #2, previously known as A3:2017-Sensitive Data Exposure, which was broad symptom rather than a root cause. The renewed name focuses on failures related to cryptography as it has been implicitly before. This category often leads to sensitive data exposure or system compromise.

<https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/>



2 Key Concepts for A02:2021 – Cryptographic Failures

Cryptography

- The art and science of keeping messages secure
- **Encryption:** An algorithm for transforming messages (**plaintext**) into secure messages (**ciphertext**), most often using a **key**.

Cryptanalysis

- The art and science of breaking secure messages
- Cryptology = Cryptography + Cryptanalysis



Definition A02:2021 – Cryptographic Failures

- The use of weak, deprecated or incorrect cryptographic algorithms
- Sensitive data transmitted over a network without cryptography
- Insecure certificates, keys and secrets
- Weak creation of random values used for keys or as seeds



Example

A02:2021 – Cryptographic Failures

```
Cipher cipher =  
Cipher.getInstance( "DES/CBC/NoPadding" );  
Cipher.getInstance( "DESede/CBC/PKCS5Padding" );  
Cipher.getInstance( "AES/ECB/PKCS5Padding" );
```

```
Cipher cipher =  
Cipher.getInstance( "AES/GCM/NoPadding" );
```




Challenges

A02:2021 – Cryptographic Failures

- Crypto knowledge is a rare commodity because the material to learn cryptography is challenging and difficult
- It is hard to verify the level of security crypto solutions attain
- It takes very senior and sophisticated developer resources



Best Protection Strategies A02:2021 – Cryptographic Failures

Manage keys and secrets properly

Use up to date and strong cryptographic algorithms, protocols and key sizes

Sensitive data requires more protection, so classify them correctly

Instrument encryption for data at rest and in transit

Configure cryptographic protocols well




Transport Layer Protection (HTTPS)


Always Use HTTPS/TLS!

- Use TLS on all connections
- Do not tolerate plaintext communication
- Use HSTS (HTTP Strict Transport Security) and preloading

Key Lifecycle




Secrets Management



- Private key is stored in the local key database for signature signing only
- Key is not extractable
- Input is the raw data to sign
- RSA512 signature is the output

Advanced Secrets Management



<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/app-service/app-service-key-vault-references>

<https://code.cash.app/app-layer-encryption>



Encrypting data at Rest : Google Tink

<https://github.com/google/tink>

- A multi-language, cross-platform library that provides **cryptographic APIs that are secure, easy to use correctly**, and hard(er) to misuse
- Java, Android, C++, Obj-C, Go, and Python are field tested and ready for production
- Integration with Secrets Management



Encrypting data at Rest : Libsodium

<https://github.com/jedisct1/libsodium>

- A high-security, cross-platform & **easy-to-use crypto library**
- Modern, easy-to-use software library for **encryption, decryption, signatures, password hashing** and more
- Supports a **variety of compilers** and operating systems



■ CAUTION

- Applied cryptography is difficult

■ VERIFY

- Bring in senior resources to build, procure and verify your cryptographic implementations, especially at rest

■ GUIDANCE

- <https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Transport Layer Protection Cheat Sheet.html>
- <https://www.ssllabs.com/>
- <https://owasp.org/www-project-o-saft/>
- <https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh>
- <https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Cryptographic Storage Cheat Sheet.html>

Summary A02:2021 – Cryptographic Failures

Concept

- Cryptography
The art and science of keeping messages secure
- Encryption: An algorithm for transforming messages (plaintext) into secure messages (ciphertext), most often using a key.
- Cryptanalysis
The art and science of breaking secure messages
Cryptology = Cryptography + Cryptanalysis

Definition

- The use of weak, deprecated or incorrect cryptographic algorithms
- Sensitive data transmitted over a network without cryptography
- Weak creation of random values used for keys or as seeds

Example

```
Cipher cipher =  
Cipher.getInstance("DES/CBC/NoPadding");  
  
Cipher cipher =  
Cipher.getInstance("AES/GCM/NoPadding");
```

Best Protection Strategies


Manage keys and secrets properly
Use up to date and strong cryptographic algorithms, protocols and key sizes
Sensitive data requires more protection, so classify them correctly
Instrument encryption for data at rest and in transit
Configure cryptographic protocols well

Good code Bad code User defined input



A3: Injection

SQL Injection



A03:2021-Injection slides down to the third position. 94% of the applications were tested for some form of injection with a max incidence rate of 19%, an average incidence rate of 3.37%, and the 33 CWEs mapped into this category have the second most occurrences in applications with 274k occurrences. Cross-site Scripting is now part of this category in this edition.

<https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/>



Key Concepts A03:2021 – Injection

- Protocol – Set of rules for exchanging information
- Protocol Encapsulation – Wrapping one set of rules into another
- Example:
 - Web application gives user control of database
 - HTTP as a protocol encapsulates SQL with user given commands
- New malicious commands are added to application hence the term "injection"
 - Injected SQL queries will run under the context of the application account allowing read and/or write access to application data and more



Definition A03:2021 – Injection

An instance where an attacker can supply untrusted data to a web application that is processed by the protocol as a command or query

This changes the execution flow typically leading to:

Stealing data from databases and other data sources

Running malicious operating system commands

Abuse authentication systems

Bypass access control

Many forms of injection depending on the protocol, such as

- SQL Injection
- Operating System (O/S) Command Injection
- LDAP Injection
- Object Query Injection



SQL Injection

Applications that **insert untrusted data into database queries via string building** allows attackers to execute arbitrary queries against back-end databases



SQL Injection

Injected SQL queries will **run under the context of the application account** allowing read and/or write access to application data and more



Looks Legit?

`jim'or'1'!='@manicode.com`



HTML5 Email Regular Expressions

The following JavaScript- and Perl-compatible regular expression is an implementation of the above definition.

```
/^[a-zA-Z0-9.!#$%&'*\+=?^_`{|}~\-]+@[a-zA-Z0-9](?:[a-zA-Z0-9-]{0,61}[a-zA-Z0-9])?(?:\.[a-zA-Z0-9](?:[a-zA-Z0-9-]{0,61}[a-zA-Z0-9])?)?)*$/
```




Even Valid Data Can Cause Injection

1

```
select id,ssn,cc,mmn from customers where  
email='$email'
```

2

```
$email = jim'or'1'!='@manicode.com
```

3

```
select id,ssn,cc,mmn from customers where  
email='jim'or'1'!='@manicode.com'
```







Example

A03:2021 – Injection (Classic SQL Injection)

```
SqlCommand objCommand = new SqlCommand (
    "SELECT id,name FROM user_table WHERE
    username = ' " & Request("NameTextBox.Text") & " ' AND
    password = ' " & Request("PasswordTextBox.Text") &
    " ' " );
```

```
SqlCommand objCommand = new SqlCommand(
    "SELECT id,name FROM user_table WHERE
    Name = @Name AND Password = @Password", objConnection);
objCommand.Parameters.Add("@Name", NameTextBox.Text);
objCommand.Parameters.Add("@Password", PasswordTextBox.Text);
```

 Good code  Bad code  User defined input



Challenges

A03:2021 – Injection

- It is hard enough getting your web application protocols and layers to work together
- Limiting what data gets passed where is seen as an additional step
- Injection is caused by insufficient user input validation, escaping or parameterization
- Injection can be use to circumvent authentication, access control and other defensive layers for data theft.



Best Protection Strategies A03:2021 – Injection

Validate untrusted data

Encode data where necessary

Configure databases using least privilege principle

Use safe APIs for protocol queries

Sanitize data when parameterization is not available



WARNING:

Some variables cannot be parameterized



```
$dbh->prepare('SELECT name, color,  
calories FROM ? WHERE calories < ?  
order by ?');
```




■ CAUTION

- One SQL Injection can lead to complete data loss so be sure to **parameterize all SQL queries**

■ VERIFY

- Code review and static analysis do an excellent job of discovering SQL Injection in your code

■ GUIDANCE

- <https://bobby-tables.com/>
- [https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Query Parameterization Cheat Sheet.html](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Query_Parameterization_Cheat_Sheet.html)

Summary A03:2021 – Injection

Concept

- Protocol – Set of rules for exchanging information
- Protocol Encapsulation – Wrapping one set of rules into another
- Example:
 - Web application gives user control of database
 - HTTP as a protocol encapsulates SQL with user given commands
- New malicious commands are added to application hence the term "injection"

Definition

- An instance where an attacker can supply untrusted data to a web application that is processed by the protocol as a command or query
- This changes the execution flow

Common Forms:

- SQL Injection – LDAP Injection
- Command Injection – Object Query Injection

Example

```
"SELECT id,name FROM user_table WHERE
    username = ' " & Request("NameTextBox.Text")...
```

```
"SELECT id,name FROM user_table WHERE
    Name = @Name AND Password = @Password",
objConnection);
objCommand.Parameters.Add("@Name", NameTextBox.Text);
...
```

Good code Bad code User defined input

Best Protection Strategies

- Validate** untrusted data
- Encode** data where necessary
- Configure** databases using least privilege principle
- Use** safe APIs for protocol queries
- Sanitize** data when parameterization is not available



A3: Injection

Cross Site Scripting (XSS)



Data Type	Context	Defense
String	HTML Body/Attribute	HTML Entity Encode/HTML Attribute Encode
String	JavaScript Variable	JavaScript Hex Encoding
String	GET Parameter	URL Encoding
String	Untrusted URL	URL Validation, Attribute Encoding
String	CSS	CSS Hex Encoding
HTML	Anywhere	HTML Sanitization (Server and Client Side)
Any	DOM	Safe use of JS API's
Untrusted JavaScript	Any	Sandboxing and Deliver from Different Origin
JSON	Embedded	JSON Serialization/Encoding
XSS Standard		Content Security Policy
DOM XSS Standard		Trusted Types



A4: Insecure Design



A04:2021-Insecure Design is a new category for 2021, with a focus on risks related to design flaws. If we genuinely want to "move left" as an industry, we need more threat modeling, secure design patterns and principles, and reference architectures.

<https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/>



3 Key Concepts for A04:2021 – Insecure Design

1. Architectural flaws

- Flaws of Omission – Ignoring a threat or security requirement
- Flaws of Commission – Bad design e.g., client-side authentication

2. Secure Design Patterns

- Examples include protocol breaks across different network zones

3. Reference Architectures

- Examples include detailed technical diagrams, zero trust user access



Definition A04:2021 – Insecure Design

Collection of security flaws that cannot be attributed to, or fixed by implementation

Broad category – captures missing or ineffective controls
e.g.,

Architectural flaws of omission, where security requirements have not been provided or are not been followed

Access has not been appropriately restricted

Design flaws have a different root causes to implementation defects




Good implementation cannot fix insecure design



Example A04:2021 – Insecure Design

```
userAccess() {  
    if (user.isAuthenticated("USER"))  
    {  
        //authorize user independent of zone  
    }  
}
```

```
userAccess() {  
    if (user.isConnectingFromZone(ZONE.SemiTrusted))  
    {  
        //authorize user based on zone  
    }  
}
```

 Good code  Bad code  User defined input



Challenges A04:2021 – Insecure Design

Not enough time is given to architecture and design

Architectural flaws of omission are often the cause of time constraints

There is no dedicated resource to look at and model the architectural threats

Secure design patterns are often incorrectly customized

It is hard to admit insecure design because the fix is not easy to implement

This can cause a huge waste of engineering time

Often reference architectures are not updated for latest frameworks

Developers want to use the next cool framework or library



Best Protection Strategies

A04:2021 – Insecure Design

Deny by principle, based on policy

Apply known reference architectures

Design using privilege separation

Generate security requirements to counter threats

Use known design patterns

Manage protocols and restrict permissions



Threat Modeling Presentations

Avi Douglen

<https://securityweekly.com/shows/threat-modeling-in-appsec-avi-douglen-asw-105/>

Tony UV

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s21al-jqIVM>

Summary A04:2021 – Insecure Design

Concept

Architectural flaws

Secure Design Patterns

- Examples include protocol breaks across different network zones

Reference Architectures

Definition

Collection of security flaws that cannot be attributed to, or fixed by implementation

Broad category – captures missing or ineffective controls

Design flaws have a different root causes to implementation defects

Example

```
userAccess() {  
  if (user.isAuthenticated("USER")) {  
    //authorize user  
  }  
  if (user.connectFromZone(ZONE.SemiTrusted)){  
    //authorize user  
  }  
}
```


Good code Bad code User defined input

Best Protection Strategies

Deny by principle, based on policy
Apply known reference architectures
Design using privilege separation
Generate security requirements to counter threats
Use known design patterns
Manage protocols and restrict permissions



A5: Security Misconfiguration



A05:2021-Security Misconfiguration moves up from #6 in the previous edition; 90% of applications were tested for some form of misconfiguration, with an average incidence rate of 4.5%, and over 208k occurrences of CWEs mapped to this risk category. With more shifts into highly configurable software, it's not surprising to see this category move up. The former category for A4:2017-XML External Entities (XXE) is now part of this risk category.

<https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/>



2 Key Concepts

A05:2021 – Security Misconfiguration

1. Security Control

- An information system safeguard or countermeasure
- Designed to protect: Confidentiality, Integrity, or Availability

2. Misconfiguration that introduces common vulnerabilities

- Not performing security hardening
- Keeping default settings

Like A4:2021 Insecure Design, also a broad category

- Often referred to as the ‘catchall’ of the OWASP Top 10



Definition A05:2021 – Security Misconfiguration

Failing to implement the necessary controls to secure the configurations of your application

Configuration puts your systems and data at risk

Vulnerabilities caused due to configuration






Example A05:2021 – Security Misconfiguration

```
<global-exceptions>
  <exception key="global.error.invalidLogin" path=""
    scope="request" type="InvalidLoginException" />
</global-exceptions>
```

```
<global-forwards>
  <forward name="sign-in" path="Sign-in.jsp" />
</global-forwards>
```

```
<global-forwards>
  <forward name="sign-in" path="/Sign-in.jsp" />
</global-forwards>
```

 Good code  Bad code  User defined input



Challenges A05:2021 – Security Misconfiguration

- This topic **can span anything** from password length to file permissions to access control **and more**
- You need to ***read the manual*** for the framework, deployment environment and **everything in between**



Best Protection Strategies

A05:2021 – Security Misconfiguration

Verify configurations

Assume insecure if you cannot verify

Read existing hardening and security guides

Know your frameworks and libraries

Apply security settings available to you

Study to know enough about your platforms



Know your Framework, Libraries and Production Environment

For frameworks, libraries and production environment:

- Hardening Guide
- Security Guide
- Security Settings
- Secure Deployment

Settings can easily open up major security gaps

e.g. “Open” AWS S3 Buckets

digitalocean.com

How To Harden the Security of Your Production Django Project

Security Python Django Python Frameworks

By Ari Birnbaum
Published on December 9, 2020 8.6k

The author selected the [COVID-19 Relief Fund](#) to receive a donation as part of the [Write for DOnations](#) program.

Introduction

Developing a Django application can be a quick and flexible and scalable. Django also offers a variety of tools to seamlessly prepare your project for production. However, when deployment, there are several ways to further secure your application. Breaking up your settings will allow you to easily switch between environments. Leveraging `dotenv` for hiding environment variables ensure you don't release any details about your project.

wordpress.org

Hardening WordPress

Categories

- Getting Started
- Installing WordPress
- Basic Usage
- Basic Administration

Security in WordPress is [taken very seriously](#), but as with any other system there are potential security issues that may arise if some basic security precautions aren't taken. This article will go through some common forms of vulnerabilities, and the things you can do to help keep your WordPress secure.

not the ultimate quick fix to concerns. If you have specific concerns or doubts, you should consult with people whom you trust to have the right knowledge of computer security.

TOPICS

- What is Security?
- Security Themes
- Vulnerabilities on Your Computer
- Vulnerabilities in WordPress
 - Updating WordPress
 - Reporting Security Issues
- Web Server Vulnerabilities
- Network Vulnerabilities
- Passwords
- FTP

struts.apache.org

STRUTS

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The Apache Software Foundation

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Configuration in ASP.NET Core

01/29/2021 • 62 minutes to read • +18

In this article

- Default configuration
- Combining service collection
- Security and user secrets
- Environment variables
- Command-line
- Set environment and command-line arguments with Visual Studio
- Hierarchical configuration data
- Configuration keys and values
- Configuration providers

spring.io

Securing a Web Application

Get the Code
[Go To Repo](#)

Projects
[Spring Security](#)

ALL GUIDES

This guide walks you through the process of creating a simple web application with resources that are protected by Spring Security.

What You Will Build

You will build a Spring MVC application that secures the page with a login form that is backed by a fixed list of users.

What You Need

moz://a SSL Configuration Generator

Server Software

- ☐ Apache
- ☐ AWS ALB
- ☐ AWS ELB
- ☐ Caddy
- ☐ Dovecot
- ☐ Exim
- ☐ Go
- ☐ HAProxy
- ☐ Jetty
- ☐ lighttpd
- ☐ MySQL
- ☒ nginx
- ☐ Oracle HTTP
- ☐ Postfix
- ☐ PostgreSQL
- ☐ ProFTPD
- ☐ Redis
- ☐ Tomcat
- ☐ Traefik

Mozilla Configuration

- ☐ Modern
Services with clients that support TLS 1.3 and don't need backward compatibility
- ☒ Intermediate
General-purpose servers with a variety of clients, recommended for almost all systems
- ☐ Old
Compatible with a number of very old clients, and should be used only as a last resort

Environment

Server Version 1.17.7

OpenSSL Version 1.1.1d

Miscellaneous

☒ HTTP Strict Transport Security

This also redirects to HTTPS, if possible

☒ OCSP Stapling

nginx 1.17.7, intermediate config, OpenSSL 1.1.1d

Supports Firefox 27, Android 4.4.2, Chrome 31, Edge, IE 11 on Windows 7, Java 8u31, OpenSSL 1.0.1, Opera 20, and Safari 9

```
# generated 2021-05-12, Mozilla Guideline v5.6, nginx 1.17.7, OpenSSL 1.1.1d, intermediate configuration
# https://ssl-config.mozilla.org/#server=nginx&version=1.17.7&config=intermediate&openssl=1.1.1d&guideline=5.6
server {
    listen 80 default_server;
    listen [::]:80 default_server;

    location / {
        return 301 https://$host$request_uri;
    }
}
```


You are here: [Home](#) > [Projects](#) > [SSL Server Test](#) > manicode.com


SSL Report: manicode.com (198.199.114.91)

Assessed on: Tue, 11 May 2021 20:29:16 UTC | [Hide](#) | [Clear cache](#)

[Scan Another »](#)

Summary

Overall Rating



Visit our [documentation page](#) for more information, configuration guides, and books. Known issues are documented [here](#).

This site works only in browsers with SNI support.

This server supports TLS 1.3.

HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS) with long duration deployed on this server. [MORE INFO »](#)



XML EXTERNAL ENTITY PROCESSING

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE foo [
  <!ELEMENT foo ANY >
  <!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd" >
]>
<foo>&xxe;</foo>
```

Configure all of your XML parsers to disable external entity resolution!

https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/XML_External_Entity_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.html



■ CAUTION

- This is a huge category that involves everywhere from the OS to the Framework to the App Server and more

■ VERIFY

If you can't verify the config assume it's not secure

■ GUIDANCE

- Learn the proper settings and ***read the manual*** for security configuration needs
- Cloud configuration is especially important and requires proper platform knowledge

Summary A05:2021 – Security Misconfiguration

Concept

Security Control

- An information system safeguard or countermeasure
- Designed to protect: Confidentiality, Integrity, or Availability

Misconfiguration that introduces common vulnerabilities

- Not performing security hardening
- Keeping default settings

Often referred to as the ‘catchall’ of the OWASP Top 10

Definition

Failing to implement the necessary controls to secure the configurations of your application

Configuration puts your systems and data at risk

Vulnerabilities caused due to configuration

Example

- ... `path=""` ... `</>`
- ... `path="Sign-in.jsp"` `</>`
- ... `path="/Sign-in.jsp"` `</>`

Best Protection Strategies

Verify configurations

Assume insecure if you cannot verify

Read existing hardening and security guides

Know your frameworks and libraries

Apply security settings available to you

Study to know enough about your platforms

Good code Bad code User defined input



A6: Vulnerable and Outdated Components



A06:2021-Vulnerable and Outdated Components

was previously titled Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities and is #2 in the Top 10 community survey, but also had enough data to make the Top 10 via data analysis. This category moves up from #9 in 2017 and is a known issue that we struggle to test and assess risk.

<https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/>



3 Key Concepts for A06:2021 – Vulnerable and Outdated Components

1. Software often has

- Past vulnerable versions using outdated components

2. Systems and frameworks have a date by when

- End of life, end of sale, unsupported

3. Attackers attempt to exploit newly published vulnerabilities

- Requiring you apply fixes or perform updates



Definition A06:2021 – Vulnerable and Outdated Components

Having in use software components that are vulnerable, unsupported, or out of date

Environments that are not patched in a timely manner

Not knowing the versions of software, you use



Challenges A06:2021 – Vulnerable and Outdated Components

- Patching is a monthly, quarterly, or undefined task, leaving organizations exposed to known vulnerabilities
- Ensuring 3rd party libraries are up to date is often neglected as a process due to time and similar constraints



Best Protection Strategies A06:2021 – Vulnerable and Outdated Components

Check continuously that your libraries are updated and then actually keep them updated

Only obtain components from official trusted sources

Remove unused dependencies

Use only features that are necessary

Stay current with latest vulnerabilities

Third Party Library Security in the NVD Database

The NIST logo is displayed in white text on a black background.

[Information Technology Laboratory](#)

NATIONAL VULNERABILITY DATABASE

VULNERABILITIES

🚩 CVE-2021-29447 Detail

Current Description

Wordpress is an open source CMS. A user with the ability to upload files (like an Author) can exploit an XML parsing issue in the Media Library leading to XXE attacks. This requires WordPress installation to be using PHP 8. Access to internal files is possible in a successful XXE attack. This has been patched in WordPress version 5.7.1, along with the older affected versions via a minor release. We strongly recommend you keep auto-updates enabled.



Security advisories

Drupal core

[Contributed projects](#)

[Public service announcements](#)

Drupal core - Critical - Third-party libraries - SA-CORE-2021-001

Project: [Drupal core](#)

Date: 2021-January-20

Security risk: **Critical** 18/25 AC:Complex/A:User/CI:All/II:All/E:Exploit/TD:Uncommon

Vulnerability: Third-party libraries

Description:

The Drupal project uses the pear Archive_Tar library, which has released a security update that impacts Drupal. For more information please see:

- [CVE-2020-36193](#)

Exploits may be possible if Drupal is configured to allow `.tar`, `.tar.gz`, `.bz2`, or `.tlz` file uploads and processes them.

Solution:

Install the latest version:

- If you are using Drupal 9.1, update to [Drupal 9.1.3](#).
- If you are using Drupal 9.0, update to [Drupal 9.0.11](#).
- If you are using Drupal 8.9, update to [Drupal 8.9.13](#).
- If you are using Drupal 7, update to [Drupal 7.78](#).

Versions of Drupal 8 prior to 8.9.x are end-of-life and do not receive security coverage.

Disable uploads of `.tar`, `.tar.gz`, `.bz2`, or `.tlz` files to mitigate the vulnerability.

Contact and more information

The Drupal security team can be reached by email at [security at drupal.org](mailto:security@drupal.org) or [via the contact form](#).

Learn more about [the Drupal Security team and their policies](#), [writing secure code for Drupal](#), and [securing your site](#).

Follow the Drupal Security Team on Twitter [@drupalsecurity](#)

Contributing organizations for this advisory

[Solathat](#)

[Acro Media Inc](#)

[Morris Animal Foundation](#)

[Acquia](#)



3rd Party Management Tools

OWASP dependency-check

<https://owasp.org/www-project-dependency-check/>

Maven Security Versions

<https://github.com/victims/maven-security-versions>

Retire.js (JavaScript 3rd party library analysis)

<https://retirejs.github.io/retire.js/>

Create PR's for your dependencies automatically

<https://dependabot.com/>



■ CAUTION

- Virtually every application has 3rd party library issues because most development teams don't focus on ensuring their libraries are up to date

■ VERIFY

- Use automation that checks periodically (e.g., every build or check-in) to see if your libraries are out of date and then actually updated them!

■ GUIDANCE

- <https://owasp.org/www-project-dependency-check/>



Summary A06:2021 – Vulnerable and Outdated Components

Concept

Software often has

- Past vulnerable versions using outdated components

Systems and frameworks have a date by when

- End of life, end of sale, unsupported

Attackers attempt to exploit newly published vulnerabilities

- Requiring you apply fixes or perform updates

Definition

Having in use software components that are vulnerable, unsupported, or out of date

Environments that are not patched in a timely manner

Not knowing the versions of software you use

Example

```
<artifactId>log4j-core</artifactId>  
  <version>2.14.1</version>
```

```
<artifactId>log4j-core</artifactId>  
  <version>2.16.0</version>  
  <!-- or newer -->
```

Best Protection Strategies

- Check** periodically your libraries are updated
- Only** obtain components from official trusted sources
- Remove** unused dependencies
- Use** only features that are necessary
- Stay** current with latest vulnerabilities

Good code Bad code User defined input



A7: Identification and Authentication Failures



A07:2021-Identification and Authentication

Failures was previously Broken Authentication and is sliding down from the second position, and now includes CWEs that are more related to identification failures. This category is still an integral part of the Top 10, but the increased availability of standardized frameworks seems to be helping.

<https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/>



3 Key Concepts for A07:2021 – Identification and Authentication Failures

1. **Digital Identity**


- Set of attributes related to a person, organization, application, or device

2. **Identification**

- The act of indicating (showing) one's identity

3. **Authentication**

- Process or action confirming the identity of a user
- The act of verifying (checking) one's identity



Definition A07:2021 – Identification and Authentication Failures

Permit attacks that disclose identity attributes

Allow for authentication controls to be subverted or bypassed

Permit weak or misconfigured attributes (e.g., weak passwords)



Example A07:2021 – Identification and Authentication Failures

```
if (user.equals(username)) {  
    if (pass.equals(password)) {  
        response.set("Invalid Password");  
    } else {  
        response.authoriseUser(user);  
    }  
}  
  
if (user.equals(username) && pass.equals(password)) {  
    response.authoriseUser(user);  
else {  
    response.set("Invalid Username or Password");  
}  
}
```



Good code



Bad code



User defined input



Challenges A07:2021 – Identification and Authentication Failures

- Weakest point is the point of interaction with the user on their identity
- Many attack scenarios including credential stuffing, brute force, session reuse attacks, weak passwords, etc.



High Level Authentication and Session Topics

- Password Binding
- General Authentication Rules
- Credential Storage
- Credential Recovery
- Look-up Recovery Tokens
- Out of Band Authentication
- Session Creation
- Session Termination
- Cookie Based Sessions
- Token Based Sessions
- Federated Authentication
- One Time Passwords
- Service Authentication



Best Protection Strategies A07:2021 – Identification and Authentication Failures

Force strong credentials e.g., passwords

Ensure user registration and recovery are hardened

Manage authenticated sessions and tokens

Alert on attacks e.g., brute force

Limit failed login attempts

Enable multi-factor authentication



How Strong Should Your Digital Identity Solution Be?



<https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-3/sp800-63-3.html>

Table 5-2 Authenticator Assurance Levels

Authenticator Assurance Level
AAL1: AAL1 provides some assurance that the claimant controls an authenticator registered to the subscriber. AAL1 requires single-factor authentication using a wide range of available authentication technologies. Successful authentication requires that the claimant prove possession and control of the authenticator(s) through a secure authentication protocol.
AAL2: AAL2 provides high confidence that the claimant controls authenticator(s) registered to the subscriber. Proof of possession and control of two different authentication factors is required through a secure authentication protocol. Approved cryptographic techniques are required at AAL2 and above.
AAL3: AAL3 provides very high confidence that the claimant controls authenticator(s) registered to the subscriber. Authentication at AAL3 is based on proof of possession of a key through a cryptographic protocol. AAL3 is like AAL2 but also requires a “hard” cryptographic authenticator that provides verifier impersonation resistance.

<https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-3/sp800-63-3.html>




Figure 6-2 Selecting AAL



Modern Password Policy



Should we be limiting characters of a password?

- Limiting password characters to protect against injection is **doomed to failure**
- Very long passwords can **cause DoS**
- **Minimum 8 char passwords**
- **Must support up to 64**
- **No more than 128**



Use a Modern Password Policy Scheme

- Consider the password policy and MFA suggestions from the standard **NIST SP800-63b**
- Do not depend on passwords as a **sole credential** anytime sensitive data is involved and use MFA



Do not limit the character type of passwords

At least 8 characters and allow up to 64 but no more than 128

Block context-specific passwords like the username or service name

Check against a list of common passwords

Check against a list of breached password

Throttle or otherwise manage brute force attempts

Don't force unnatural password special character rules

Don't use password security questions or hints

No more mandatory password expiration for the sake of it

Force the use of MFA anytime sensitive data is in play

NIST Special Publication 800-63b: Digital AuthN



Password1!



Password Storage



Configure Password Hashing Functions Correctly

- Use **Argon2id** with a minimum configuration of **15 MiB of memory**, an **iteration count of 2**, and 1 degree of parallelism
- If Argon2id is not available, use **bcrypt** with a **work factor of 10 or more** and with a password limit of 72 bytes
- For legacy systems using **scrypt**, use a minimum CPU/memory cost parameter of (2^{16}) , a minimum block size of 8 (1024 bytes), and a parallelization parameter of 1
- If FIPS-140 compliance is required, use **PBKDF2** with a work factor of 310,000 or more and set with an internal hash function of HMAC-SHA-256

https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Password_Storage_Cheat_Sheet.html



■ CAUTION

- Authentication and Session Management are very complex layers of software to both build and verify

■ VERIFY

- There are many requirements to consider for Authentication and Session Management

■ GUIDANCE

- <https://github.com/OWASP/ASVS/blob/master/4.0/en/0x11-V2-Authentication.md>
- <https://github.com/OWASP/ASVS/blob/master/4.0/en/0x12-V3-Session-management.md>
- <https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-3/>



Summary A07:2021 – Identification and Authentication Failures

Concept

Digital Identity

- Set of attributes related to a person, organization, application, or device

Identification

- The act of indicating (showing) one's identity

Authentication

- Process or action confirming the identity of a user
- The act of verifying (checking) one's identity

Definition

Permit attacks that disclosure identity attributes

Allow for authentication controls to be subverted or bypassed

Permit weak or misconfigured attributes (e.g., weak passwords)

Example

```
if (pass.equals(password)) {  
    response.set("Invalid  
    Password");  
  
response.set("Invalid Username or  
Password");  
}
```

Best Protection Strategies

Ensure user registration and recovery are hardened

Limit failed login attempts

Alert administrators on attacks e.g., brute force


Force strong passwords

Implement multi-factor authentication

Good code Bad code User defined input




A8: Software and Data Integrity Failures



A08:2021-Software and Data Integrity Failures is a new category for 2021, focusing on making assumptions related to software updates, critical data, and CI/CD pipelines without verifying integrity. One of the highest weighted impacts from Common Vulnerability and Exposures/Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVE/CVSS) data mapped to the 10 CWEs in this category. A8:2017-Insecure Deserialization is now a part of this larger category.

<https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/>



3 Key Concepts for A08:2021 Software and Data Integrity Failures

1. Software Integrity Verification – Process of verifying the inclusion of functionality from untrusted software sources

Applications relying on libraries, modules, resources or plugins received from untrusted sources

Examples of untrusted sources are repositories and Content Delivery Networks (CDNs)

2. Continuous Integration (CI) – Merging all developers' working software copies to a shared main instance, typically several times a day

3. Continuous Delivery (CD) – Releasing software reliably in an automated way without manual intervention



Definition A08:2021 Software and Data Integrity Failures

Software code that does not prevent the inclusion of functionality from untrusted sources

Downloading or updating source code dependencies from software repositories without performing integrity checks

Deserializing untrusted data or applying updates to a previously trusted application



Example A08:2021 Software and Data Integrity Failures

```
Update() {  
    var data = download("https://manicode.com/update.sh");  
    exec(data);  
}
```

```
Update() {  
    var data = download("https://manicode.com/update.sh");  
    verifyHash(data, "e7de35ebe643d7a$d23fd814639ac420fc2a9b6");  
    verifyGitContent(data);  
    exec(data);  
}
```





Rule of Two

Check your scripts not once ... but twice!

- Be very wary of scripts you download and run daily
- I'm looking at you DevOps pipelines!

Solution?

- **Verify once via the download hash**
- **Verify a second time via the published repot**



Main Challenges A08:2021 Software and Data Integrity Failures

1. Many solutions auto-update without sufficient integrity protections without immediate solutions
 - Attackers are targeting software update mechanisms and this problem is on the rise and widespread
2. Software integrity problems are often challenging to detect
 - Keeping your 3rd party components updated (A06), is a significant challenge and is a big part of software and data integrity protection



Best Protection Strategies A08:2021 Software and Data Integrity Failures

Learn enough cryptography to verify integrity of downloads

Ensure all 3rd party software and frameworks are updated

Verify software updates independently, using cryptography

Apply and use digital signatures

Note what software sources you trust

Summary A08:2021 Software and Data Integrity Failures

Concept

- Software Integrity Verification – Process of verifying the inclusion of functionality from untrusted software sources
- Applications relying on libraries, modules, resources or plugins received from untrusted sources
- This can happen most notably during Continuous Integration (CI) and/or Continuous Delivery (CD)

Definition

- Software code that does not prevent the inclusion of functionality from untrusted sources
- Downloading or updating source code dependencies without performing integrity checks
- Deserializing untrusted data or applying updates to a previously trusted application

Example

```
Update() {  
    var data = download("https://manicode.com/update.sh");  
    exec(data);  
}  
  
Update() {  
    var data = download("https://manicode.com/update.sh");  
    verifyHash(data, "e7de35ebe643d7a5d23fd814639ac420fc2a9b6");  
    verifyGitContent(data);  
    exec(data);  
}
```

Best Protection Strategies

Learn enough cryptography to verify integrity of downloads
Ensure all 3rd party software and frameworks are updated
Verify software updates independently, using cryptography
Apply and use digital signatures
Note what software sources you trust

Good code Bad code User defined input



A9: Security Logging and Monitoring Failures



A09:2021-Security Logging and Monitoring

Failures was previously A10:2017-Insufficient Logging & Monitoring and is added from the Top 10 community survey (#3), moving up from #10 previously. This category is expanded to include more types of failures, is challenging to test for, and isn't well represented in the CVE/CVSS data. However, failures in this category can directly impact visibility, incident alerting, and forensics.

<https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/>



Why Logging?

"...the goal of logging is to be able to alert on specific security events..."

https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Application_Logging_Vocabulary_Cheat_Sheet.html



3 Key Concepts for A09:2021 – Security Logging and Monitoring Failures

1. Event Logging provides a standard, centralized way of recording important software events
2. Event Monitoring is the process of collecting, analyzing and signaling event occurrences
3. Security Logging and Monitoring focuses on events that can impact the *confidentiality, integrity or availability of software*

This category is unique in that it is not a specific risk that leads to compromised software

Aids in the accountability, visibility, incident alerting, and forensics and has wide reaching implications to security management of software



Definition A09:2021 – Security Logging and Monitoring Failures

Auditable events, warnings and errors are not adequately logged

Developers and Security Staff must work together to agree on a security centric logging standard so developers know exactly what events to log

Developers should consider logging labels specific to security

Proper logging infrastructure is necessary in order to securely collect and store logs long term



Example A09:2021 – Security Logging and Monitoring Failures

```
if (!user.hasAccess("ADMIN_ACTION")) {  
    //quietly deny access  
}
```

```
if (!user.hasAccess("ADMIN_ACTION")) {  
    //deny access and log  
    log.event(Event.SECURITY, Event.CRITICAL, "User  
    attempted to access admin action without permission");  
}
```




Challenges A09:2021 – Security Logging and Monitoring Failures

- Developers are often unaware of the many security events that need to be logged
 - Appropriate alerting thresholds and response escalation processes are not in place or effective.
 - This can lead to applications that cannot detect, escalate, or alert for attacks or suspicious activity
- Security Operations Centre (SOC) teams often do not onboard application-level logging correctly



Best Protection Strategies A09:2021 – Security Logging and Monitoring Failures

Build a secure logging infrastructure for collection and storage of logs long term

Ensure all authentication and access control events, both failed and successful, are logged

Standardize machine-readable formats for events and alerts

Test incident response based on logging events



What To Log

- Authentication Events
- Access Control Events
- Rate Limiting Events
- File Upload Events
- Input Validation Events
- Malicious Behavior Events
- Permission Changes
- Sensitive Data Changes
- Sequence Errors
- Session Management Errors
- System Events
- User Management

[https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Logging Vocabulary Cheat Sheet.html](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Logging_Vocabulary_Cheat_Sheet.html)



■ CAUTION

- Be sure developers and security teams work together to ensure good security logging

■ VERIFY

- Verify that proper security events are getting logged and consumed properly by your SOC teams

■ GUIDANCE

- https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Application_Logging_Vocabulary_Cheat_Sheet.html
- https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Logging_Cheat_Sheet.html

Summary A09:2021 – Security Logging and Monitoring Failures

Concept

- Event Logging provides a standard, centralized way of recording important software events
- Event Monitoring is the process of collecting, analyzing and signaling event occurrences
- Security Logging and Monitoring focuses on events that can impact the confidentiality, integrity or availability of software

Definition

- Auditable events, warnings and errors are not adequately logged
- Developers should consider logging labels specific to security
- Proper logging infrastructure is necessary here to securely collect and store logs long term

Example

```
if (!user.hasAccess("ADMIN_ACTION")) {  
    //quietly deny access  
}  
  
if (!user.hasAccess("ADMIN_ACTION")) {  
    //deny access and log  
    log.event(Event.SECURITY, Event.CRITICAL, "User attempted to access  
admin action without permission");  
}
```

Best Protection Strategies

- Build** a secure logging infrastructure for collection and storage of logs long term
- Ensure** all authentication and access control events, both failed and successful, are logged
- Standardize** machine-readable formats for events and alerts
- Test** incident response based on logging events

Good code Bad code User defined input




A10: Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF)




A10:2021-Server-Side Request Forgery is added from the Top 10 community survey (#1). The data shows a relatively low incidence rate with above average testing coverage, along with above-average ratings for Exploit and Impact potential. This category represents the scenario where the security community members are telling us this is important, even though it's not illustrated in the data at this time.

<https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/>

SSRF At GitLab





CVE-ID

CVE-2021-22214 [Learn more at National Vulnerability Database \(NVD\)](#)
• CVSS Severity Rating • Fix Information • Vulnerable Software Versions • SCAP Mappings • CPE Information

Description

When requests to the internal network for webhooks are enabled, a server-side request forgery vulnerability in GitLab CE/EE affecting all versions starting from 10.5 was possible to exploit for an unauthenticated attacker even on a GitLab instance where registration is limited

References

Note: [References](#) are provided for the convenience of the reader to help distinguish between vulnerabilities. The list is not intended to be complete.

- [CONFIRM:https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/cves/-/blob/master/2021/CVE-2021-22214.json](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/cves/-/blob/master/2021/CVE-2021-22214.json)
- [URL:https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/cves/-/blob/master/2021/CVE-2021-22214.json](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/cves/-/blob/master/2021/CVE-2021-22214.json)
- [MISC:https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/issues/322926](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/issues/322926)
- [URL:https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/issues/322926](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/issues/322926)
- [MISC:https://hackerone.com/reports/1110131](https://hackerone.com/reports/1110131)
- [URL:https://hackerone.com/reports/1110131](https://hackerone.com/reports/1110131)

Assigning CNA

GitLab Inc.

https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/49637



Microsoft Exchange 2019 - SSRF to Arbitrary File Write (Proxylogon) (PoC)

EDB-ID:

49637

CVE:

2021-27065
2021-26855

Author:

TESTANULL

Type:

WEBAPPS

Platform:

2021-03-11
WINDOWS

Date:


EDB Verified: ✗

Exploit:  / 

Vulnerable App:



Exploit Title: Microsoft Exchange 2019 - SSRF to Arbitrary File Write (Proxylogon)



4 Key Concepts for A10:2021 – Server-Side Request Forgery

1. **Server-Side** refers to programs and operations that run on the server
2. **Request Forgery** means crafting a web request that appears legitimate, but contains malicious input
3. **Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)** forces a user to execute unwanted actions, while authenticated on a web application
4. **One-click attack** involves sending a malicious URL to an authenticated user that executes an action they do not approve
 - One-click attack resulting in the transfer of funds



Definition A10:2021 – Server-Side Request Forgery

Attack that forces a server to make a request to an unexpected resource

Can lead to a wide variety of critical impacts including loss of data, privilege escalation, and more

A common vulnerability in N-tiered webservices and microservices



Example A10:2021 – Server-Side Request Forgery

```
addToPage(String url) {  
    if (Validator.isValidURL(url)) {  
        return fetchContent(url);  
    }  
}
```

```
addToPage(String url) {  
    if (Validator.isValidURL(url)) {  
        if (url.domain == "manicode.com") {  
            return fetchContent(url);  
        }  
    }  
}
```



Good code



Bad code



User defined input



SSRF In The Real World

August '19

Capital One hack highlights SSRF concerns for AWS

Infosec pros warn of server-side request forgery vulnerabilities in AWS following the Capital One data breach, which may have revealed an issue regarding the AWS metadata service.



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<https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/news/252467901/Capital-One-hack-highlights-SSRF-concerns-for-AWS>

1. Accessing the credentials using the SSRF bug

- The attacker seems to have accessed the AWS credentials for a role called `ISRM-WAF-Role` via the endpoint


```
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ISRM-WAF-Role
```

 using the SSRF bug.

For example, if the vulnerable application was at `http://example.com` and the SSRF existed in a GET variable called `url`, then the exploitation was possible as

```
curl http://example.com/?url=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ISRM-WAF-Role
```

<https://blog.appsecco.com/an-ssrf-privileged-aws-keys-and-the-capital-one-breach-4c3c2cded3af>



Challenges A10:2021 – Server-Side Request Forgery

- Traditional code and dynamic scanning tools struggle to find *Server-Side Request Forgery* accurately
- Passing URLs and IP addresses is very common (e.g., for logging purposes)



Best Protection Strategies A10:2021 – Server-Side Request Forgery

Validate origin of URLs and IPs when parameters

Ensure authentication and access control on APIs

Setup URL encoding for untrusted parameters

Test and limit network service access with network controls




SSRF Detailed Defense Summary

- Great session management on internal/intranet APIs
- Great access control on internal/intranet APIs
- When URL's are a parameter that the server then acts upon do strong URL Validation
- ***Avoid taking URLs as a full parameter that the server then acts on***
- Building URLs safely with URL Encoding of Parameters
- Limit services with network controls
- Microsegmentation

URLs to backend REST APIs are built with concatenation instead of URIBuilder (Prepared URI)

- Most publically exposed REST APIs turn around and invoke internal REST APIs using URLConnections, Apache HttpClient or other REST clients. If user input is directly concatenated into the URL used to make the backend REST request then the application could be vulnerable to Extended HPPP.



A `var = request.getParameter("data");`

B `new URL("https://internal/data/" + var)`



https://someserver/search?data=23

```
var = request.getParameter("data");  
new URL("https://internal/data/" + var)
```

../../../../admin/report/global

https://internal/admin/report/global



../../../../admin/report/global
%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2
f%2e%2e%2f%61%64%
6d%69%6e%2f%72%65
%70%6f%72%74%2f%6
7%6c%6f%62%61%6c



new


URL("https://internal/data/" +
encodeURIComponent(var))

new

URL("https://internal?data=" +
encodeURIComponent(var))

URLs to backend REST APIs are built with concatenation instead of URIBuilder (Prepared URI)

- Most publically exposed REST APIs turn around and invoke internal REST APIs using URLConnections, Apache HttpClient or other REST clients. If user input is directly concatenated into the URL used to make the backend REST request then the application could be vulnerable to Extended HPPP.



A `var = request.getParameter("data");`

B `new URL(https://internal/data/ + URLEncoder.encode(var))`

Summary A10:2021 – Server-Side Request Forgery

Concept

- Server-Side refers to programs and operations that run on the server
- Request Forgery means crafting a web request that appears legitimate, but contains malicious input
- Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) forces a user to execute unwanted actions, while authenticated on a web application

Definition

- Attack that forces a server to make a request to an unexpected resource
- Can lead to a wide variety of critical impacts including loss of data, privilege escalation, and more.
- A common vulnerability in N-tiered webservices and microservices

Example

```
addToPage(String url) {  
    if (Validator.isValidURL(url)) {  
        return fetchContent(url);  
    }  
  
    addToPage(String url) {  
        if (url.domain == "manicode.com") {  
            return fetchContent(url);  
        }  
    }  
}
```

Good code Bad code User defined input

Best Protection Strategies

Validate origin for URLs and IPs when parameters

Ensure authentication and access control on APIs

Setup URL encoding for untrusted parameters

Test and limit network service access with network controls



Conclusion



Develop Secure Code

- Use OWASP's Application Security Verification Standard (ASVS) for more comprehensive secure coding requirements
- <https://owasp.org/www-project-application-security-verification-standard/>
- Follow the guidance in OWASP's Cheatsheet Series
- <https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/>
- Use standard security components and frameworks that are a fit for your organization



Test Continuously For Security

- Automate as much security testing as you can. Consider OWASP ZAP and Dependency Check.
- <https://owasp.org/www-project-zap/>
- <https://owasp.org/www-project-dependency-check/>
- Review your applications manually following the OWASP Testing Guide
- <https://owasp.org/www-project-web-security-testing-guide/>



OWASP Top 10 – 2021 Key InfoSec Concepts

01 Broken Access Control

Access Control – Authorization

02 Cryptographic Failures

Cryptography – Encryption – Cryptanalysis

03 Injection

Protocol Encapsulation – Injecting Commands

04 Insecure Design

Architectural Flaws – Secure Design Patterns

05 Security Misconfiguration

Security Controls – Misconfiguration Vulnerabilities

06 Vulnerable and Outdated Components

End of Life – End of Sale – Unsupported Software

07 Identification and Authentication Failures

Digital Identity – Identification

08 Software and Data Integrity Failures

Software Integrity Verification – (CI) & (CD)

09 Security Logging and Monitoring Failures

Event Logging – Event Monitoring

10 Server-Side Request Forgery

Request Forgery – One Clicks Attacks (CSRF)



OWASP Top 10 – 2021 Definition 1-Liners

01 Broken Access Control

Users Operate Outside Given Permissions

02 Cryptographic Failures

Use of Weak or Incorrect Cryptographic Algorithms

03 Injection

Run Unauthorized Protocols or Commands

04 Insecure Design

Security Flaws not Fixable by Implementation

05 Security Misconfiguration

Vulnerabilities Caused due to Misconfiguration

06 Vulnerable and Outdated Components

Vulnerable, Unsupported or Out of Date Software

07 Identification and Authentication Failures

Permit Attacks that Disclose Identity Attributes

08 Software and Data Integrity Failures

Prevent Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted

09 Security Logging and Monitoring Failures

Events, Warnings, Errors not Adequately Logged

10 Server-Side Request Forgery

Server forced to make Malicious Outbound Request

OWASP Top 10 – 2021 Examples (Good & Bad)

01 Broken Access Control

02 Cryptographic Failures

03 Injection

04 Insecure Design

05 Security Misconfiguration

06 Vulnerable and Outdated Components

07 Identification and Authentication Failures

08 Software and Data Integrity Failures

09 Security Logging and Monitoring Failures

10 Server-Side Request Forgery

```
if (user.isAuthorized("ADMIN"))
```

```
Cipher.getInstance("DESede/CBC/PKCS5Padding");
```

```
... WHERE username = ' ' & Request("username")
```

```
if(user.isConnectingFromZone(ZONE.SemiTrusted)
```

```
<fwd name="signin" path="Signin.jsp" />
```

```
<artifactId>log4j-core</..><version>2.16.0</...
```

```
response.set("Invalid Username or Password");
```

```
verifyGitContentWithHash(data);
```

```
log.event("attempted admin access");
```

```
if (Validator.isValidURL(url)) {
```



Good code



Bad code



User defined input



OWASP Top 10 – 2021 Best Protection Strategies

01 Broken Access Control	DEBAR	Design Enforce Build Assign Refuse
02 Cryptographic Failures	MUSIC	Manage Use Sensitive Instrument Configure
03 Injection	VECUS	Validate Encode Configure Use Sanitize
04 Insecure Design	DADGUM	Deny Apply Design Generate Use Manage
05 Security Misconfiguration	VARKAS	Verify Assume Read Know Apply Study
06 Vulnerable and Outdated Components	CORUS	Check Only Remove Use Stay
07 Identification and Authentication Failures	FEMALE	Force Ensure Manage Alert Limit Enable
08 Software and Data Integrity Failures	LEVAN	Learn Ensure Verify Apply Note
09 Security Logging and Monitoring Failures	BEST	Build Ensure Standardize Test
10 Server-Side Request Forgery	VEST	Validate Ensure Setup Test



It Has Been A Pleasure!

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