
# The (bright) future of API Security

Isabelle MAUNY - Field CTO - 42Crunch



### Glad to be here!

- Field CTO / Founder of 42Crunch
- French National, living in Spain for past 20 years
- Most of career in the integration world, pioneering what would become API Management
- Fell quite recently into security.. but we will talk about that later.





# Data is the new gold!

#### APIs are a critical path to data

Equifax

Experian

Verizon

T-Mobile


Facebook

LinkedIN

Parler







Evolution of web architectures

We lost the server-side controller layer



Security Architecture has to evolve from protecting this...




...to protecting this!

"Treat APIs like they have a direct interface into your underlying systems and can bypass security controls – because that is pretty much what they do," said Peter Liebert, former CISO, state of California

# Development plays hard to catch...





APPLICATION SECURITY









CommitStrip.com

Security is still an afterthought!

No news there.



Application Security is hard!

For everyone.

Too much to master?

I am learning every day!




### Thou shalt...


- Current security processes/tools create a lot of work for developers
  - False positives
  - Delayed builds (hours)
- Imposing security rules that impact productivity only results in friction, "malicious obedience" and frustration



# Design Flaws

APIs suffer from many design flaws, which are hard, including impossible to fix after the fact.





The AppSec stack

Increased role/responsibility of developers.

From: https://snyk.io/blog/cloud-transforms-it-security-appsec/

## APIs have different vulnerabilities (REST)

- API1: Broken Object Level Access Control
- API2: Broken Authentication
- API3: Excessive Data Exposure
- API4: Lack of Resources & Rate Limiting
- API5: Missing Function Level Access Control
- API6: Mass Assignment
- API7 : Security Misconfiguration
- API8 : Injection
- API9: Improper Assets Management
- API10: Insufficient Logging & Monitoring









### API1 Parler (January 2021) API2 API3 Wild combination of issues! API4 70 TB of user's data leaked API5 Core Issues API6 Sequential IDs (IDOR/BOLA) API7 No Authentication API8 No Rate limiting API9 Leaked raw metadata about posts, including location Deleted data was not deleted, just hidden in the Ul API10



Zoom on BOLA

The #1 issue today

## GraphQL

- Similar security issues as REST plus:
  - Queries complexity (DOS)
  - Queries recursivity (DOS)
  - Queries "suggestions"
- Authorization layer is complex as not covered by framework - Likely to led to more BOLA-style issues.

# GraphQL

#### Describe your data

```
type Project {
  name: String
  tagline: String
  contributors: [User]
}
```

#### Ask for what you want

```
project(name: "GraphQL") {
  tagline
}
```

#### Get predictable results

```
{
    "project": {
        "tagline": "A query language for APIs"
     }
}
```

#### How do we address this?

- Common language across Dev and AppSec
- Empower Developers
- Trust but Verify
- Cover security basics
- Restore Controller Layer
- Frameworks for core tasks
- Automation




### Better Communication


- · APIs are "popping up like mushrooms"
- AppSec teams usually have very limited knowledge/visibility about APIs development
- AppSec is shooting in the dark to find issues
- AppSec and Dev need a common language to describe those APIs



## Common Language

- API blueprint is required
- Specifications like <u>OpenAPI</u> or <u>AsyncAPI</u> have a key role to play
- · Why?
  - Standard, Extensible language widely used by both sec and dev tooling
  - Enables Security as Code approach
  - Enables static analysis
  - Enables dynamic testing
- Enables positive security model





Negative Security Model (Deny List)



Positive Security Model (Allow List)

## Empower Developers

- "No shame, no blame"
- Tools which can be used from dev flow
  - Limited false positives
  - Easy to use from IDEs
  - Provide remediation guidelines
  - Interactive Security Testing



## Controller Layer

- Control everything server-side
- Handles auth and authorization
  - Who has access to what, at operation and data level.
  - Who can talk to who?
- Service Meshes/API Gateways play part of that role but we need more (especially for authorization / BOLA prevention)



## Trust but Verify

- App Sec teams want to ensure corporate security standards are respected
- Allow them to express static rules of what is acceptable or not, for example:
  - OAuth with azn\_code is mandatory
  - JWTs must be signed with PS256
  - All inbound parameters must be constrained by patterns and limits
- Results visible to dev teams as early as possible.




### Cover the basics!

- Threat Modelling for APIs
- Input validation
  - Anything coming in: headers, body, query params, JWTs contents, etc.
- Output validation
  - · Control the data: PII, Sensitive Data, tokens
- "Proper" rate limiting
  - By operation
  - Auth / Tokens endpoints
- Logging



## What we see is working

- Educate developers
- Separate security controls so that development focuses on business logic
  - Authentication/Authorization
  - Input/Output Validation
- Provide corporate libraries for key functionality
  - Logging especially
- Prevent uncontrolled access to <u>npm</u>, DockerHub and similar.
- Create many "negative tests" (10X more than "200 OK" tests






Automate Security

Only solution with 1000's of APIs to protect.

## What we see is working

- Empower Dev teams with CI/CD templates they manage themselves
  - Particularly for large enterprises
- Automate "negative tests" for each release (even if it happens every day!)
- Automate "basic" pen-testing
- Protect the software supply chain by systematically validating libs and images
- Automate the injection of security policies



## Future of API Security

- Dev and AppSec reconcile their conflicting goals through new processes and tools
- Developer are empowered to discover and fix security issues in their IDEs
- Security is expressed as code and automated

