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Secure Development Lifecycles: Motivation & Overview

SecAppDev 2019

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pwc

Bart De Win ?

- 20 years of Information Security Experience
  - Ph.D. in Computer Science - Application Security
- Author of >60 scientific publications
- ISC² CSSLP & CISSP certified
- Director @ Cyber&Privacy PwC Belgium:
  - Leading the Threat & Vuln. Mngt. team
  - (Web) Application tester (arch. review, code review, dynamic review, …)
  - Proficiency in Secure Software Development Lifecycle (SDLC) and Software Quality (ISO25010)
- OWASP SAMM co-leader
- Contact me at bart.de.win@pwc.com

Agenda

1. **Setting the Scene**
2. Process Models
3. Modern Development
4. Maturity Models
5. Good Practices
6. Conclusion

What's in a name …

"Secure Development"

Application Security Problem



Multi-channel
Technology stacks
Adaptability
Software complexity
Outsourcing
Api's
Integration
Faster
Cloud
Usability
Open Source



Your view on your software?

Application Security during Software Development



The "classic" approach to secure software



Problematic, since:

- Focus on bugs, not flaws
- Penetration can cause major harm
- Not cost efficient
- No security assurance
  - All bugs found ?
  - Bug fix fixes all occurences ? (also future ?)
  - Bug fix might introduce new security vulnerabilities

Secure Development Lifecycle ?



Enterprise-wide software security program

- Strategic approach to assure software quality
- Goal is to increase systematicity and avoid surprises
- Goal is NOT to have fully secure applications
- Focus on security *functionality* and security *hygiene*

Shift Left

SDLC Cornerstones



(Some) SDLC-related initiatives



•Microsoft SDL



•TouchPoints

NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology

•SP800-64

•CLASP



•BSIMM

SSE CMM

•SSE-CMM

1000 01111 1000 11111 1000 SAFECode Software Assurance Forum for Excellence in Code Driving Security and Integrity

Gartner

Software Engineering Institute | Carnegie Mellon

•TSP-Secure

Software Assurance Maturity Model
A guide to building security into software development

•SAMM

•GASSP

ISO/IEC 27034

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2. **Process Models**
3. Modern Development
4. Maturity Models
5. Good Practices
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Textbook Example: Microsoft SDL (SD3+C)

Training

1. **Training**
2. Requirements
3. Design
4. Implementation
5. Verification
6. Release
7. Response

Content

- Secure design
- Threat modeling
- Secure coding
- Security testing
- Privacy

Why?

Requirements

1. Training
2. **Requirements**
3. Design
4. Implementation
5. Verification
6. Release
7. Response

Project inception

When you consider security and privacy at a foundational level

Cost analysis

Determine if development and support costs for improving security and privacy are consistent with business needs

Design

1. Training
2. Requirements
3. **Design**
4. Implementation
5. Verification
6. Release
7. Response

Establish and follow best practices for Design



≠ secure-coding best practices



Risk analysis



Threat modeling

STRIDE

Implementation

Creating documentation and tools for users that address security and privacy

1. Training
2. Requirements
3. Design
4. **Implementation**
5. Verification
6. Release
7. Response

Establish and follow best practices for development



1. Review available information resources
2. Review recommended development tools
3. Define, communicate and document all best practices and policies

Verification

Security and privacy testing



1. Training
2. Requirements
3. Design
4. Implementation
5. **Verification**
6. Release
7. Response

1. Confidentiality, integrity and availability of the software and data processed by the software
2. Freedom from issues that could result in security vulnerabilities

Security push

Release

Public pre-release review

1. Training
2. Requirements
3. Design
4. Implementation
5. Verification
6. **Release**
7. Response

1. **Privacy**
2. Security



Planning

Preparation for incident response

Release

Final security and privacy review

1. Training
2. Requirements
3. Design
4. Implementation
5. Verification
6. **Release**
7. Response

Outcomes:

- **Passed FSR**
- **Passed FSR** with exceptions
- **FSR escalation**

Release to manufacturing/release to web

Sign-off process to ensure security, privacy and other policy compliance

Response

Execute Incident Response Plan

1. Training
2. Requirements
3. Design
4. Implementation
5. Verification
6. Release
7. **Response**

=> able to respond appropriately to reports of vulnerabilities in their software products, and to attempted exploitation of those vulnerabilities.

Microsoft SDL Practices (Anno 2019)

1. Provide Training
2. Define Security Requirements
3. Define Metrics and Compliance Reporting
4. Perform Threat Modeling
5. Establish Design Requirements
6. Define and Use Cryptographic Standards
7. Manage the Security Risk of Using Third-Party Components
8. Use Approved Tools
9. Perform Static Analysis Security Testing (SAST)
10. Perform Dynamic Analysis Security Testing (DAST)
11. Perform Penetration Testing
12. Establish a Standard Incident Response Process

Source: www.microsoft.com

Microsoft SDL Example - Using Open Source



Source: www.microsoft.com

Final note on process models

Process models provide a good starting point into secure development lifecycles

- Overview of different activities that are relevant
- Indication of ordering and dependencies

Only few companies still work using a traditional, waterfall-only paradigm

- Process models will not suffice for modern development environments
- Need to be complemented (or replaced) with other techniques to be useful

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Rationale and Fundamentals

- Many traditional, large-scale software development projects are going wrong
  - Combination of business and technical causes
- Software is delivered late in the lifecycle
- Little flexibility during the process

Agile models focus on:

- Frequent interaction with stakeholders
- Short cycles

=> to increase flexibility and reduce risk

Scrum



Modern & Secure development: a mismatch ?

Agile Dev.	Security
Speed & Flexibility	Stable & Rigorous
Short cycles	Extra activities
Limited documentation	Extensive analysis
Functionality-driven	Non-functional

Modern Development







Secure Modern Development General principles

- Make security a natural part of the lifecycle, but don't overdo
  - lightweight, in-phase and iterative
  - Preventive, detective and reactive controls

- Be involved at key moments in the lifecycle
- Automate security
- Work on established concepts & practices
- Continuous testing
- Small steps at a time (i.e. continuous improvement)

Security Tactics for Agile Development

Secure Agile Manifesto

1. **Our highest priority is to satisfy the customer through early and continuous delivery of valuable software.**
2. **Working valuable software is the primary measure of progress.**
3. **Security is a shared responsibility between everybody involved in the life cycle of the product.**
4. **Welcome changing (security) requirements, even late in development, taking into account that enough security is enough.**
5. **Dare to deploy software. Not every release requires full assurance.**
6. **Provide security elements to use in development projects. These elements should be known, readily available and continuously evolving.**
7. **Security should be automated and incorporated in the development practices.**
8. **Build projects around motivated individuals. Knowing how to build secure software is an intrinsic motivator.**
9. **The most effective solution emerges from self-organizing teams able to call upon security experts when needed.**
10. **At regular intervals, the team reflects on how to become more effective, adjusting its processes and technical solutions accordingly.**

Security Tactics for CI/CD



Security Tactics for DevOps



Final note on modern development

Modern development changes the way security can be considered and evaluated throughout the software lifecycle

- New types of security challenges need to be considered and catered for
- At the same time, a new risk model creates opportunities for more "lightweight" security assurance

Development methods are changing very rapidly, and it is difficult to keep up for security

- **Empowerment**, **shared responsibility** and **automation** are the key to a modern secure development approach

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Why Maturity Models for SDLC?

An organization's behavior changes slowly over time.

- Changes must be **iterative** while working toward long-term goals

There is no single recipe that works for all organizations

- A solution must enable **risk-based** choices tailored to the organization

Guidance related to security activities must be prescriptive

- A solution must provide enough details for non-security-people

Overall, must be simple, well-defined, and **measurable**

To answer questions like

What should we be doing in our SDLC?

What are others doing in terms of software assurance?

What are good practices for software assurance?

Should we focus on threat modelling or code reviews?

How much time/effort/cost will this take?

Textbook Example: OWASP SAMM

Scope: Entire software lifecycle, rather than just development.

https://owaspsamm.org/

Version 1.5, 2017

Core Structure



Notion of Maturity

0 Implicit starting point representing the activities in the practice being unfulfilled

1 Initial understanding and adhoc provision of security practice

2 Increase efficiency and/or effectiveness of the security practice

3 Comprehensive mastery of the security practice at scale

CMMI ?

An example

Implementation Review *...more on page 52*

	IR 1	IR 2	IR 3
OBJECTIVE	**Opportunistically find basic code-level vulnerabilities and other high-risk security issues.**	**Make implementation review during development more accurate and efficient through automation.**	**Mandate comprehensive implementation review process to discover language-level and application-specific risks.**
ACTIVITIES	A. Create review checklists from known security requirements B. Perform point-review of high-risk code	A. Utilize automated code analysis tools B. Integrate code analysis into development process	A. Customize code analysis for application-specific concerns B. Establish release gates for code review

SAMM also defines

Objective
Activities
Results
Success Metrics
Costs
Personnel
Related Levels

Security Testing — ST 1

Establish process to perform basic security tests based on implementation and software requirements

ACTIVITIES

A. Derive test cases from known security requirements

From the known security requirements for a project, identify a set of test cases to check the software for correct functionality. Typically, these test cases are derived from security concerns surrounding the functional requirements and business logic of the system, but should also include generic tests for common vulnerabilities based on the implementation language or technology stack.

Often, it is most effective to use the project team's time to build application-specific test cases and utilize publicly available resources or purchased knowledge bases to select applicable general test cases for security. Although not required, automated security testing tools can also be utilized to cover the general security test cases.

This test case planning should occur during the requirements and/or design phases, but must occur before final testing prior to release. Candidate test cases should be reviewed for applicability, efficacy, and feasibility by relevant development, security, and quality assurance staff.

B. Conduct penetration testing on software releases

Using the set of security test cases identified for each project, penetration testing should be conducted to evaluate the system's performance against each case. It is common for this to occur during the testing phase prior to release.

Penetration testing cases should include both application-specific tests to check soundness of business logic as well as common vulnerability tests to check the design and implementation. Once specified, security test cases can be executed by security-savvy quality assurance or development staff, but first-time execution of security test cases for a project team should be monitored by a security auditor to assist and coach team members.

Prior to release or deployment, stakeholders must review results of security tests and accept the risks indicated by failing security tests at release time. In the latter case, a concrete timeline should be established to address the gaps over time.

ASSESSMENT
- Do projects specify security testing based on defined security requirements?
- Is penetration testing performed on high risk projects prior to release?
- Are stakeholders aware of the security test status prior to release?

RESULTS
- Independent verification of expected security mechanisms surrounding critical business functions
- High-level due diligence toward security testing
- Ad hoc growth of a security test suite for each software project

SUCCESS METRICS
- >50% of projects specifying security test cases in the past 12 months
- >50% of stakeholders briefed on project status against security tests in the past six months

COSTS
- Buildout or license of security test cases
- Ongoing project overhead from maintenance and evaluation of security test cases

PERSONNEL
- QA Testers
- Security Auditor
- Developers
- Architects
- Business Owners

RELATED LEVELS
- Security Requirements - 1

Conducting assessments

Secure Architecture	SCORE	0.0	0.2	0.5	1.0	
Are project teams provided with a list of recommended third-party components?		NO	PER TEAM	ORG WIDE	INTEGRATED PROCESS	
Are project teams aware of secure design principles and do they apply them consistently?		NO	SOME	HALF	MOST	SA 1
Do you advertise shared security services with guidance for project teams?		NO	BUS AREA	ORG WIDE	ORG WIDE & REQUIRED	
Are project teams provided with prescriptive design patterns based on their application architecture?		NO	PER TEAM	ORG WIDE	INTEGRATED PROCESS	
Do project teams build software from centrally-controlled platforms and frameworks?		NO	SOME	HALF	MOST	SA 2
Are project teams audited for the use of secure architecture components?		NO	ONCE	EVERY 2-3 YRS	ANNUALLY	SA 3

Assessments and Roadmaps



Roadmap templates

- To make the "building blocks" usable, SAMM defines Roadmaps templates for typical kinds of organizations
  - Independent Software Vendors
  - Online Service Providers
  - Financial Services Organizations
  - Government Organizations
- Organization types chosen because
  - They represent common use-cases
  - Each organization has variations in typical software-in
  - Optimal creation of an assurance program is different for each



SAMM Tools



Challenges in v1.5

- Waterfall-like setup
- Lacking activities/perspectives
- Logical flow between activities
- Measuring quality of implementation (vs. coverage)
- Lack of a good dataset

These will be tackled in the **upcoming v2.0** of the model (foreseen for Summer 2019).

SAMM v2.0 (sneak preview)

Governance	Design	Implementation	Verification	Operations
• Strategy & Metrics • Policy & Compliance • Education & Guidance	• Threat Assessment • Security Requirements • Security Architecture	• Secure Build • Secure Deployment • Defect Management	• Architecture Assessment • Requirements Driven Testing • Security Testing	• Incident Management • Environment Management • Operational Management

Final note on maturity models

Maturity models (such as SAMM) provide an excellent framework for reasoning on software assurance, on a *strategic* level:

- Evaluate your as-is
- Define and improve towards your to-be
- Compare against peers

Popular approach for companies today that work on software assurance

Different flavours exist, choose one that fits your company's context.

The models are easy to start with, but challenging to *fully* grasp. Don't let this scare you, and get started!

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Good Practices for Secure Development

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Summary and key take-aways

- Secure development is …
  - in the eye of the beholder
  - everybody's responsibility

- SDLC flavours exist for traditional and modern development methods
- Maturity models can help in reasoning about progress

- All models need to be adapted and fine-tuned to your organisation's context and culture to become effective
  - This is the challenging part
  - It's a continuous journey

Questions ?