Recent Web Security Technology

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About myself: Lieven Desmet

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- Research manager at KU Leuven
  - (Web) Application Security
- Active participation in OWASP
  - Board member of the OWASP Belgium Chapter
  - Co-organizer of the OWASP AppSec EU 2015 Conference
- Program director at SecAppDev

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iMinds-DistriNet, KU Leuven

- Headcount:
  - 10 professors
  - 65 researchers
- Research Domains
  - Secure Software
  - Distributed Software
- Academic and industrial collaboration in 30+ national and European projects

https://distrinet.cs.kuleuven.be

Primer on Client-Side Web Security

- Covers the landscape of client-side Web security
  - Building blocks of the Web
  - 7 attacker models, broken down in 10 capabilities
  - 13 attacks and their countermeasures
- Provides an up-to-date overview of
  - State-of-the-art in web security
  - State-of-practice on the Web
  - Recent research and standardization activities
  - Security best practices per category



Recent Web Security Technology

Server-side security policies, enforced by the browser

Sans Top 25 - OWASP Top 10

Rank	Score	ID	Name
[1]	93.8	CWE-89	Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')
[2]	83.3	CWE-78	Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')
[3]	79.0	CWE-120	Buffer Copy without Checking Size of Input ('Classic Buffer Overflow')
[4]	77.7	CWE-79	Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')
[5]	76.9	CWE-306	Missing Authentication for Critical Function
[6]	76.8	CWE-862	Missing Authorization
[7]	75.0	CWE-798	Use of Hard-coded Credentials
[8]	75.0	CWE-311	Missing Encryption of Sensitive Data
[9]	74.0	CWE-434	Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type
[10]	73.8	CWE-807	Reliance on Untru
[11]	73.1	CWE-250	Execution with U
[12]	70.1	CWE-352	Cross-Site Reque
[13]	69.3	CWE-22	Improper Limitat
[14]	68.5	CWE-494	Download of Coc
[15]	67.8	CWE-863	Incorrect Authori
[16]	66.0	CWE-829	Inclusion of Func
[17]	65.5	CWE-732	Incorrect Permis
[18]	64.6	CWE-676	Use of Potentially
[19]	64.1	CWE-327	Use of a Broken
[20]	62.4	CWE-131	Incorrect Calcula
[21]	61.5	CWE-307	Improper Restric
[22]	61.1	CWE-601	URL Redirection t
[23]	61.0	CWE-134	Uncontrolled For
[24]	60.3	CWE-190	Integer Overflow
[25]	59.9	CWE-759	Use of a One-Way Hash without a Salt

Focus on vulnerabilities and logical flaws in the code, and server-side mitigations

This talk focuses on infrastructural support as a complementary line of defense

- 2013 (New)
ession Management
ences
A5 – Security Misconfiguration
A6 – Sensitive Data Exposure
A7 – Missing Function Level Access Control
A8 – Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
A9 – Using Known Vulnerable Components
A10 – Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards

SANS

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Recent security technology on the web



Overview

- Introduction
- #1 Securing browser-server communication
- #2 Mitigating script injection attacks
- #3 Framing content securely
- Example security architecture: Combining CSP & Sandbox
- Wrap-up

Introduction

Overview

- Basic security policy for the web:
  - Same-Origin Policy
- What does it mean for scripts running on your page?
- What does it mean for frames included in your page?

Two basic composition techniques

Script inclusion

```
<html><body>
…
<script src="http://3rdparty.com/script.js"></script>
…
</body></html>
```



Iframe integration

```
<html><body>
…
<iframe src="http://3rdparty.com/frame.html"></iframe>
…
</body></html>
```



Securing browser-server communication

Overview

- Attacks:
  - Session hijacking
  - SSL Stripping
- Countermeasures:
  - Use of SSL/TLS
  - Secure flag for session cookies
  - HSTS header
  - Public Key Pinning

Network attacks: Session hijacking



HTTPS to the rescue...



Problem cured?

- TLS usage statistics:
  - 0.78% of active domains use TLS (with valid SSL certificate)
  - For Alexa top 1 million: 27.86% use TLS

Internet SSL Survey 2010, Qualys

- Remaining problems:
  - Mixed use of HTTPS/HTTP and session cookies
  - Mixed content websites
  - SSL Stripping attacks

Mixed use of HTTPS/HTTP

- Cookies are bound to domains, not origins
- By default, cookies are sent both over HTTPS and HTTP
- Any request to your domain over HTTP leaks the (session) cookies…

Secure flag for cookies

- Issued at cookie creation (HTTP response)
  - Set-Cookie: PREF=766awg-VZ; Domain=yourdomain.com; Secure
- If set, the cookie is only sent over an encrypted channel
- Should be enabled by default for your session cookies!

Secure flag: state-of-practice

- Browser compatibility
  - All recent browsers support the secure flag for cookies
- Usage statistics



	Websites with Secure Cookie
1	bnpparibasfortis.be
2	paypal.com
3	microsoftonline.com
4	snapfish.be
5	ing.be
6	cph.be
7	goldenpalace.be
8	airbnb.be
9	moneymiljonair.be
10	unibet.com

Own experiment on top 2500 websites, visited from Belgium (Alexa)

Some background on this experiment

- Number of inspected domains: 2449
- Total number of inspected pages: 302855
- Average number of pages per domains: 123
- 18,25% of domains serve HTTPS pages





Mixed content inclusions:
TLS-enabled sites under attack



Source: *Ping Chen et. al.* A Dangerous Mix: Large-scale analysis of mixed-content websites. *ISC 2013*

Mixed content inclusions:
Large scale assessment of the state-of-practice

- Alexa Top 100,000 domains
- Crawled over 480,000 pages belonging to the Alexa top 100,000
- Discovered:
  - 18,526 TLS-protected sites
  - 7,980 sites have mixed content (43% of the sites)
  - 150,179 scripts are included over HTTP (26% of the sites)

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Source: *Ping Chen et. al.* A Dangerous Mix: Large-scale analysis of mixed-content websites. *ISC 2013*

Distribution of mixed-JavaScript sites
across the top Alexa Top 100,000



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Source: *Ping Chen et. al.* A Dangerous Mix: Large-scale analysis of mixed-content websites. *ISC 2013*

Distribution of mixed-JavaScript sites
across Top 10 site categories (McAfee's web database)



Source: *Ping Chen et. al.* A Dangerous Mix: Large-scale analysis of mixed-content websites. *ISC 2013*

HTTP to HTTPS bootstrapping



HTTP to HTTPS bootstrapping

- HTTP 301/302 response
  - Location header redirects browser to the resource over HTTPS
  - Location: https://mysite.com/
- Meta refresh
  - Meta-tag in HEAD of HTML page
  - <meta http-equiv="refresh" content="0;URL='https://mysite.com/'">
- Via JavaScript
  - document.location = “https://mysite.com”

Network attacks: SSL Stripping

Web Browser











Web Server

Moxie Marlinspike, BlackHat DC 2009

Strict Transport Security (HSTS)

- Issued by the HTTP response header
  - Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=60000
- If set, the browser is instructed to visit this domain only via HTTPS
  - No HTTP traffic to this domain will leave the browser
- Optionally, also protect all subdomains
  - Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=60000; includeSubDomains

HSTS: state-of-practice

- Browser compatibility
  - Chrome 4+, Firefox 4+, Opera 12+, Safari 7+, IE12
- Usage statistics



	Domain	# of pages using HSTS	# of pages visited	Percentage of pages
1	etsy.com	164	171	95.9064
2	dropbox.com	105	108	97.2222
3	lapetition.be	172	172	100
4	cph.be	97	100	97
5	paypal.com	73	159	45.9119
6	airbnb.be	54	54	100
7	twitter.com	47	48	97.9167
8	github.com	46	75	61.3333
9	mozilla.org	38	178	21.3483
10	google.com	16	154	10.3896

Own experiment on top 2500 websites, visited from Belgium (Alexa)

But can I trust the CAs ?

- Comodo (March 2011)
  - 9 fraudelent SSL certificates
- Diginotar (July 2011)
  - Wildcard certificates for Google, Yahoo!, Mozilla, WordPress, …
- Breaches at StartSSL (June 2011) and GlobalSign (Sept 2012) reported unsuccessful
- …

Public Key Pinning (HPKP)

- Issued as HTTP response header
  - Public-Key-Pins: max-age=500;
    pin-sha1="4n972HfV354KP560yw4uqe/baXc=";
    pin-sha1="IvGeLsbqzPxdI0b0wuj2xVTdXgc="
- Freezes the certificate by pushing a fingerprint of (parts of) the certificate chain to the browser
  - Options: includeSubdomains, report-uri
- Currently an IETF Internet-Draft
  - Public Key Pinning Extension for HTTP
- Supported in Chrome 18+, Firefox 35+

Recap: Securing browser-server communication

- Use of TLS
  - be aware of mixed-content inclusions!
- Secure flag for cookies
  - to protect cookies against leaking over HTTP
- HSTS header
  - to force TLS for all future connections
- Public Key Pinning
  - to protect against fraudulent certificates

#2 Mitigating script injection attacks

Overview

- Attack:
  - Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
- Countermeasures:
  - HttpOnly flag for session cookies
  - X-XSS-Protection header
  - Content Security Policy (CSP)

Example: Stored or persistent XSS

Attacker

HTTP request injecting a script into the persistent storage of the vulnerable server

HTTP response



Vulnerable server

Regular http request

Victim

Http response containing script as part of executable content

HttpOnly flag for cookies

- Issued at cookie creation (HTTP response)
  - Set-Cookie: PREF=766awg-VZ; Domain=yourdomain.com; Secure; HttpOnly
- If set, the cookie is not accessible via DOM
  - JavaScript can not read or write this cookie
- Mitigates XSS impact on session cookies
  - Protects against hijacking and fixation
- Should be enabled by default for your session cookies!

HttpOnly: state-of-practice

- Browser compatibility
  - Support in all browsers
- Usage statistics



	Websites with HttpOnly Cookie
1	multibazar.be
2	nbb.be
3	peugeot.be
4	fatsecret.be
5	bloovi.be
6	brusselslife.be
7	whoman2.be
8	chronorace.be
9	dacia.be
10	avevewinkels.be

Own experiment on top 2500 websites, visited from Belgium (Alexa)

X-XSS-Protection

- Best-effort protection in the browser against reflected XSS
  - Can be controlled via the X-XSS-Protection header in the HTTP response
  - On by default
- Completeness of protection
  - Protects only against reflected XSS
  - Multiple bypasses have been reported

X-XSS-Protection: modes of operation

- Default protection
  - X-XSS-Protection: 1
- Optional opt-out
  - X-XSS-Protection: 0
- Blocking mode
  - X-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block
  - Prevents the page from rendering

X-XSS-Protection: state-of-practice

- Browser compatibility:
  - Internet Explorer 8+, Chrome and Safari
- Usage statistics



	Domain	# of pages using x_xss_protection	# of pages visited	Percentage of pages
1	etsy.com	170	171	99.4152
2	google.com	151	154	98.0519
3	google.it	166	169	98.2249
4	search-results.com	144	170	84.7059
5	google.de	173	173	100
6	google.fr	164	164	100
7	google.es	156	158	98.7342
8	google.co.uk	150	151	99.3377
9	vroom.be	158	177	89.2655
10	google.co.in	168	168	100

Own experiment on top 2500 websites, visited from Belgium (Alexa)

Content Security Policy (CSP)

- Issued as HTTP response header
  - Content-Security-Policy: script-src 'self'; object-src 'none'
- Specifies which resources are allowed to be loaded as part of your page
- Extremely promising as an additional layer of defense against script injection

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CSP set of directives

- There are a whole set of directives
  - Here we discuss CSP v1.1 (February 11, 2014)

- default-src
  - Takes a sourcelist as value
  - Default for all resources, unless overridden by specific directives
  - Only allowed resources are loaded

CSP source lists

- Space delimited list of sources
  - ‘self’
  - ‘none’
  - origin(s)
- Examples
  - https://mydomain.com
  - https://mydomain.com:443
  - http://134.58.40.10
  - https://*.mydomain.com
  - https:
  - *://mydomain.com

CSP set of directives (2)

- script-src
  - From which sources, scripts are allowed to be included
- object-src
  - Flash and other plugins
- style-src
  - stylesheets
- img-src
  - images
- media-src
  - sources of video and audio

CSP set of directives (3)

- child-src
  - list of origins allowed to be embedded as frames
  - replaces the deprecated frame-src directive
- font-src
  - web fonts
- connect-src
  - To which origins can you connect (e.g. XHR, websockets)
- frame-options
  - Control framing of the page
- sandbox
  - Trigger sandboxing attribute of embeded iframes

CSP requires sites to “behave”

- Inline scripts and CSS is not allowed
  - All scripts need to be externalized in dedicated JS files
  - All style directives need to be externalized in dedicated style files
  - Clean code separation
- The use of *eval* is not allowed
  - To prevent unsafe string (e.g. user input) to be executed

Example: inline scripts

page.html

```
<script>
  function runMyScript() {
    alert('My alert');
  }
</script>

<a href="#" onClick="runMyScript();">
This link shows an alert!</a>
```

Example: externalized scripts

External JS →

page.html

```
<script src="myscript.js"></script>
<a href="#" id="myLink">This link shows an alert!</a>
```

JavaScript code

Binding to page

myscript.js

```
function runMyScript() {
  alert('My alert');
}
document.addEventListener('DOMContentReady',
function () {
  document.getElementById('myLink')
          .addEventListener('click', runMyScript);
});
```

Insecure relaxations, but be careful!

- To temporary allow inline scripts
  - Content-Security-Policy: script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'
- To temporary allow eval
  - Content-Security-Policy: script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval'
- To temporary allow inline style directives
  - Content-Security-Policy: style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'

Script/style nonces and hashes

- To allow controlled inline-scripts:
  - Mark your script with a nonce

```
Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'
https://example.com 'nonce-Nc3n83cnSAd3wc3Sasdfn939hc3‘
```

```
<script nonce="Nc3n83cnSAd3wc3Sasdfn939hc3">
alert("Allowed because nonce is valid.")
</script>
```

  - Add a hash of your inline script to the policy

```
Content-Security-Policy: script-src 'sha256-
YWIzOWNiNzJjNDRlYzc4MTgwMDhmZDlkOWI0NTAyMjgyY2MyMWJl
MWUyNjc1ODJlYWJhNjU5MGU4NmZmNGU3OAo='
```



sha256

```
<script>alert('Hello, world.');</script>
```

CSP reporting feature

- CSP reports violations back to the server owner
  - server owner gets insides in actual attacks
    - i.e. violations against the supplied policy
  - allows to further fine-tune the CSP policy
    - e.g. if the policy is too restrictive
- report-uri directive
  - report-uri /my-csp-reporting-handler
  - URI to which the violation report will be posted

Example violation report

```
Content-Security-Policy: script-src 'self' https://apis.google.com;
report-uri http://example.org/my_amazing_csp_report_parser
```

CSP violation report

```
{
  "csp-report": {
    "document-uri": "http://example.org/page.html",
    "referrer": "http://evil.example.com/",
    "blocked-uri": "http://evil.example.com/evil.js",
    "violated-directive": "script-src 'self' https://apis.google.com",
    "original-policy": "script-src 'self' https://apis.google.com; report-
uri http://example.org/my_amazing_csp_report_parser"
  }
}
```

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Based on “HTML5Rocks: An introduction to Content Security Policy” (Mike West)

CSP Reporting: one step further

- Apart from reporting violations via the report-uri directive
- CSP can also run in report only mode
  - Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only: default-src: 'none'; script-src 'self'; report-uri /my-csp-reporting-handler
  - Violation are reported
  - Policies are not enforced

Some CSP examples

- Examples:
  - Mybank.net lockdown
  - SSL only
  - Social media integration
  - Facebook snapshot

Example: mybank.net lockdown

- Scripts, images, stylesheets
  - from a CDN at https://cdn.mybank.net
- XHR requests
  - Interaction with the mybank APIs at https://api.mybank.com
- Iframes
  - From the website itself
- No flash, java, ….

```
Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none';
script-src https://cdn.mybank.net;
style-src https://cdn.mybank.net;
img-src https://cdn.mybank.net;
connect-src https://api.mybank.com;
child-src 'self'
```

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Based on “HTML5Rocks: An introduction to Content Security Policy” (Mike West)

Example: SSL only

- Can we ensure to only include HTTPS content in our website?

```
Content-Security-Policy: default-src https: ;
script-src https: 'unsafe-inline';
style-src https: 'unsafe-inline'
```

- Obviously, this should only be the first step, not the final one!

Example: social media integration

- Google +1 button
  - Script from https://apis.google.com
  - Iframe from https://plusone.google.com
- Facebook
  - Iframe from https://facebook.com
- Twitter tweet button
  - Script from https://platform.twitter.com
  - Iframe from https://platform.twitter.com

```
Content-Security-Policy: script-src https://apis.google.com
https://platform.twitter.com;
child-src https://plusone.google.com https://facebook.com
https://platform.twitter.com
```

Based on “HTML5Rocks: An introduction to Content Security Policy” (Mike West)

Example: Facebook snapshot

```
X-WebKit-CSP: default-src *;
script-src https://*.facebook.com http://*.facebook.com
https://*.fbcdn.net http://*.fbcdn.net *.facebook.net *.google-
analytics.com *.virtualearth.net *.google.com *.spotilocal.com:*
chrome-extension://lifbcibllhkdhoafpjfnlhfpfgnpldfl 'unsafe-inline'
'unsafe-eval' https://*.akamaihd.net http://*.akamaihd.net;style-
src * 'unsafe-inline';
connect-src https://*.facebook.com http://*.facebook.com
https://*.fbcdn.net http://*.fbcdn.net *.facebook.net
*.spotilocal.com:* https://*.akamaihd.net ws://*.facebook.com:*
http://*.akamaihd.net;
```

Third-party JavaScript is everywhere

- Advertisements
  - Adhese ad network
- Social web
  - Facebook Connect
  - Google+
  - Twitter
  - Feedsburner
- Tracking
  - Scorecardresearch
- Web Analytics
  - Yahoo! Web Analytics
  - Google Analytics
- …




Spongecell
kiko
Trumba
eskobo
mayomi
Pageflakes
vimeo
skobsie
shadows
groovee
YouTube
Zimbra
LookSmart
FURL
smugmug
newsgator
Blogniscient
TiN FiNGER
shutterfly
PodDater
Feedster
favoor
Planzo.com
ZAZZLE
Tailrank
TagWorld
nuvvo
dogear
yakalike
grouper
ODDPOST
QOOP
iNeds
Lulu
BR
blish
flagr
FireAnt
simply hired
Veoh
theadcloud
rbloc.com
cafépress
Renkoo
pixagogo
gather
Agatra
browsr
oyogi
standpoint
meebo
EXTRA TASTY!
last.fm
YEDDA
Jotspot
Frappr!
jeteye
dabble
Writeboard
SHOUTWIRE
iKarma
AirSet
tech memeorandum
CalendarHub
Suprglu
pando
zigtag
Findory
backfence
clipmarks
wayfaring
gOFFICE
AllPeers
Rallypoint
Zoozio
blogbeat
Ziggs
vSocial
Boltfolio
wink
riya
Wordcast
Opinity
measuremap
bluepulse
imvu
STREAMLOAD
Ta-da Lists
FeedSky
jellyBam.INC
PubSub
nativetext
CONGOO
PODZINGER
RSS MAD
FeedTier
phanfare
Fruitcast
dPolls
flickr
Ning
Ookles
Strongspace
zoominfo
CASTPOST
WIKIPEDIA
yubnub

Number of remote script providers per site

- 88.45% includes at least 1 remote JavaScript library
- 2 out of 3 sites relies on 5 or more script providers
- 1 site includes up to 295 remote script providers



Source: Nick Nikiforakis et. al. You are what you include: Large-scale evaluation of remote JavaScript inclusions. CCS 2012

Most popular JavaScript libraries and APIs

Offered service	JavaScript file	% Alexa Top 10K
Web analytics	www.google-analytics.com/ga.js	68,37%
Dynamic Ads	pagead2.googlesyndication.com/pagead/show_ads.js	23,87%
Web analytics	www.google-analytics.com/urchin.js	17,32%
Social Networking	connect.facebook.net/en_us/all.js	16,82%
Social Networking	platform.twitter.com/widgets.js	13,87%
Social Networking & Web analytics	s7.addthis.com/js/250/addthis_widget.js	12,68%
Web analytics & Tracking	edge.quantserve.com/quant.js	11,98%
Market Research	b.scorecardresearch.com/beacon.js	10,45%
Google Helper Functions	www.google.com/jsapi	10,14%
Web analytics	ssl.google-analytics.com/ga.js	10,12%

Source: Nick Nikiforakis et. al. You are what you include: Large-scale evaluation of remote JavaScript inclusions. CCS 2012

CSP: state-of-practice

- Browser compatibility:
  - Firefox 4, Chrome 14+, Safari 5+, Opera 15+, Internet Explorer 10+
  - Older header names: X-WebKit-CSP, X-Content-Security-Policy
- Usage statistics



	Domain	# of pages using x_content_security_policy	# of pages visited	Percentage of pages
1	github.com	42	75	56
2	hootsuite.com	33	155	21.2903
3	bpost.be	15	176	8.5227
4	dropbox.com	3	108	2.7778
5	etsy.com	3	171	1.7544
6	mozilla.org	3	178	1.6854
7	adobe.com	1	173	0.578
8	twitter.com	1	48	2.0833

Own experiment on top 2500 websites, visited from Belgium (Alexa)

Recap: Mitigating script injection attacks

- HttpOnly flag for session cookies
  - To protect cookies against hijacking and fixation from JavaScript
- X-XSS-Protection header
  - Coarse-grained control over built-in browser protection against reflected XSS
- Content Security Policy (CSP)
  - Domain-level control over resources to be included
  - Most promising infrastructural technique against XSS
  - Interesting reporting-only mode

#3 Framing content securely

Overview

- Attacks:
  - Click-jacking
  - Same domain XSS
- Countermeasures:
  - X-Frame-Options header / frame-ancestors
  - HTML5 sandbox attribute for iframes

Click-jacking

Source: "Busting Frame Busting: a Study of Clickjacking Vulnerabilities on Popular Sites" (W2SP 2010)

Unsafe countermeasures

- A lot of unsafe ways exist to protect against clickjacking
  - if (top.location != location)
    top.location = self.location;
  - if (parent.location != self.location)
    parent.location = self.location;
- Can easily be defeated by
  - Script disabling/sandboxing techniques
  - Frame navigation policies
  - XSS filters in browsers

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Source: "Busting Frame Busting: a Study of Clickjacking Vulnerabilities on Popular Sites" (W2SP 2010)

X-Frame-Options

- Issued by the HTTP response header
  - X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
  - Indicates if and by who the page might be framed
- 3 options:
  - DENY
  - SAMEORIGIN
  - ALLOW-FROM uri

X-Frame-Options (deprecated)

- Browser compatibility:
  - Firefox, Internet Explorer, Opera
  - *Safari, Chrome*
- Usage statistics



	Domain	# of pages using X-Frame-Options	# of pages visited	Percentage of pages
1	equibel.be	158	158	100
2	etsy.com	170	171	99.4152
3	soundcloud.com	166	173	95.9538
4	replacedirect.be	165	165	100
5	google.it	137	169	81.0651
6	napoleongames.be	142	145	97.931
7	bonprix-wa.be	176	177	99.435
8	dropbox.com	105	108	97.2222
9	csj.be	172	175	98.2857
10	facebook.com	60	63	95.2381

Own experiment on top 2500 websites, visited from Belgium (Alexa)

XFO has been integrated in CSP

- New CSP directive: frame-ancestors
  - Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors https://partnerA.com https://partnerB.com
- In contrast to X-Frame-Options, a sourcelist is allowed
  - Common advice is to tailor per partner

Limitations of framing content in same origin

- Iframe integration provides a good isolation mechanism
  - Each origin runs in its own security context, thanks to the Same-Origin Policy
  - Isolation only holds if outer and inner frame belong to a different origin
- Hard to isolate untrusted content within the same origin

HTML5 sandbox attribute

- Expressed as attribute of the iframe tag
  - <iframe src= "/untrusted-path/index.html" sandbox></iframe>
  - <iframe src="/untrusted-path/index.html" sandbox= "allow-scripts"></iframe>

- Level of Protection
  - Coarse-grained sandboxing
  - ‘SOP but within the same domain’

Default sandbox behavior

- Plugins are disabled
- Frame runs in a unique origin
- Scripts can not execute
- Form submission is not allowed
- Top-level context can not be navigated
- Popups are blocked
- No access to raw mouse movements data

Sandbox relaxation directives

- Relaxations:
  - allow-forms
  - allow-popups
  - allow-pointer-lock
  - allow-same-origin
  - allow-scripts
  - allow-top-navigation
- Careful!
  - Combining allow-scripts & allow-same-origin voids the sandbox isolation
- Plugins can not be re-enabled

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HTML5 sandbox

- Browser compatibility
  - Internet Explorer, Chrome, Safari, Firefox, Opera
- Usage statistics



Own experiment on top 100 websites, visited from Belgium (Alexa)

Sandbox has been integrated in CSP

- New CSP directive: sandbox
  - Content-Security-Policy: sandbox
  - Content-Security-Policy: sandbox allow-scripts
- Similar options apply:
  - allow-forms
  - allow-pointer-lock
  - allow-popups
  - allow-same-origin
  - allow-scripts
  - allow-top-navigation

Recap: Framing content securely

- CSP: Frame ancestors
  - Robust defense against click-jacking
  - Any state-changing page should be protected
- CSP: Sandbox attribute
  - Coarse-grained sandboxing of resources and JavaScript
  - Interesting enabler for security architectures

Example security architecture: Combining CSP & Sandbox

"Securing the Client-Side: Building safe web applications with HTML5" (Mike West, Devoxx 2012)

CSP & HTML5 sandbox as security enabler

- Combination of CSP and HTML5 sandbox
  - Enabling technologies for drafting a web application security architecture
  - Allows to define whether or not certain functions/scripts are allowed to run in the origin of the site

- Presented by Mike West at Devoxx 2012
  - Used for document rendering in ChromeOS, …

Example of sandboxing unsafe javascript



Main page (index.html)

Content-Security-Policy: script-src 'self'

```
<html><head>
   <script src="main.js"></script>
</head>
<body>
   <a href="#" id="sandboxFrame"/>Click here</a>
   <iframe id="sandboxFrame" sandbox="allow-scripts"
src="sandbox.html">
   </iframe>
   <div ="#content"></div>
</body></html>
```

Sandboxed frame (sandbox.html)

```
<html><head>
   <script>
          window.EventListener('message', function(event) {
           var command = event.data.command;
                 var context = event.data.context;
                 var result = callUnsafeFunction(command, context);
                 event.source.postMessage({
                        html: result}, event.origin);
                 });
   </script>
</head></html>
```

Main script (main.js)

```
document.querySelector('#click').addEventListener('click',
 function(){
   var iframe = document.querySelector('#sandboxFrame');
          var message = {
            command = 'render';
            context = {thing: 'world‘}};
          iframe.contentWindow.postMessage(message, '*');
});

window.addEventListener('message', function(event){
 //Would be dangerous without the CSP policy!
 var content = document.querySelector('#content');
 content.innerHTML = event.data.html;
});
```

And what's next?

- Seamless integrating unsafe input with the sandbox attribute
  - <iframe **sandbox seamless srcdoc**="<p>Some paragraph</p>"> </iframe>
- seamless attribute
  - Renders visually as part of your site
  - Only for same-origin content
- srcdoc attribute
  - Content as a attribute value instead of a remote page

Wrap-up

Conclusion

- Whole new range of security features
  - Browser-side enforcement, under control of the server
- NOT a replacement of secure coding guidelines, but an interesting additional line of defense for
  - Legacy applications
  - Newly deployed applications
- And most probably, there is many more to come in the next few years…

Content Security Policy 1.0 - CR

Mitigate cross-site scripting attacks by whitelisting allowed sources of script, style, and other resources.

Global	74.56% + 10.67% = 85.22%
unprefixed:	70.54% + 10.67% = 81.21%

Current aligned | Usage relative | Show all

IE	Firefox	Chrome	Safari	Opera	iOS Safari *	Opera Mini *	Android Browser *	Chrome for Android
		31					4.1	
		35					4.3	
		36					4.4	
8		37					4.4.4	
9		38						
10 [1]	34	39	7.1	26	7.1			
11 [1]	35	40	8	27	8.1	8	37	40
TP	36	41		28				
	37							
	38							

Notes | Known issues (3

The standard HTTP header is `Content-Security-Policy` which is used unless otherwise noted.

caniuse.com

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