


Internet Security Protocols


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With thanks to Joris Claessens and Walter Fumy






Goals







- Understanding how security can be added to the basic Internet protocols
- Understanding TLS and its limitations
- Understanding IPsec and its limitations



Outline

- Internet summary
- IETF process
- Basic principles
- Transport layer security
 - SSL / TLS
- Network layer security
 - IPSec, VPN, SSH





Communications insecurity

- architectural errors
 - wrong trust assumptions
 - default = no security
- protocol errors
 - unilateral entity authentication
 - weak entity authentication mechanism
 - downgrade attack
- modes of operation errors
 - no authenticated encryption
 - wrong use of crypto
- cryptographic errors
 - weak crypto
- implementation errors

range of wireless communication is often underestimated!

A historical perspective (1)

wireless data

Year	Technology
1900	Vernam: rotor machines
1960	LFSR
1980	block ciphers
1990	X25
2000	WLAN, PAN, 3GSM, TLS, SSH, IPsec

wired data

Year	Technology
1900	analog scramblers
1960	digital encryption
1980	STU
1990	VoIP
2000	VoIP

A historical perspective (2)

mobile phones

Year	Technology	Notes
1980	AMPS	analog cloning, scanners
1990	GSM/TDMA	TDMA cloning
2000	3GSM	attacks on A5, COMP128

WLAN

Year	Technology	Notes
1997	WEP	WEP broken
2002	WPA	WPA weak
2004	WPA2 802.11i	

PAN

Year	Technology	Notes
1999	Bluetooth	Bluetooth problems
2004	Zigbee	

Security Goals (started in ISO 7498-2)

- confidentiality:
 - entities (anonymity)
 - data
 - traffic flow
- (unilateral or mutual) entity authentication
- data authentication (connection-less or connection-oriented): data origin authentication + data integrity
- access control
- non-repudiation of origin versus deniability

Security Protocols & Services

- Cryptographic techniques:
 - symmetric encipherment
 - message authentication mechanisms
 - entity authentication mechanisms
 - key establishment mechanisms (e.g., combined with entity authentication)

Internet Security Protocols

- security services depend on the layer of integration:
 - the mechanisms can only protect the payload and/or header information available at this layer
 - header information of lower layers is **not protected!!**

Security: at which layer?

- Application layer:
 - closer to user
 - more sophisticated/granular controls
 - end-to-end
 - but what about firewalls?
- Lower layer:
 - application independent
 - hide traffic data
 - but vulnerable in middle points
- Combine?

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SP Architecture I: Encapsulation

- Bulk data: symmetric cryptography
- Authenticated encryption: best choice is to authenticate the ciphertext

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SP Architecture II: Session (Association) Establishment

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Algorithm Selection

"a la carte"

- each algorithm (encryption, integrity protection, pseudo-random function, Diffie-Hellman group, etc.) is negotiated independently
- less compact to encode
- more flexible
- e.g., IKEv1

"suite"

- all parameters are encoded into a single suite number; negotiation consists of offering one or more suites and having the other side choose
- simpler and more compact to encode
- potentially exponential number of suites
- less flexible
- e.g., TLS and IKEv2

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Transport layer security

SSL / TLS

SSL/TLS Protocols

- connection-oriented data confidentiality and integrity, and optional client and server authentication.

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Transport Layer Security Protocols

- IETF Working Group: **Transport Layer Security (tls)**
 - RFC 2246 (PS), 01/99
- transparent secure channels independent of the respective application.
- available protocols:
 - *Secure Shell (SSH)*, SSH Ltd.
 - *Secure Sockets Layer (SSL)*, Netscape
 - *Transport Layer Security (TLS)*, IETF

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SSL / TLS

- Mainly in context of WWW security, i.e., to secure the HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP)
- But, in between application layer and TCP, thus can be used to secure other applications than HTTP too (IMAP, telnet, ftp, ...)

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Other WWW security protocols


- PCT: Microsoft’s alternative to SSL
- S-HTTP: S/MIME-like protocol
- SET: for credit card transactions
- XML-Signature: PKCS#7-based signature on XML documents
- ...

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SSL / TLS

- “Secure Sockets Layer” (Netscape)
 - SSL 2.0: security flaws!
 - SSL 3.0: still widely used - not interoperable with TLS 1.0
- “Transport Layer Security” (IETF)
 - TLS 1.0: adopted SSL 3.0 with minor changes
 - RFC 2246, 01/99 (PS)
- TLS: security at the transport layer
 - can be used (and is intended) for other applications too
 - end-to-end secure channel, but nothing more...
 - data is only protected during communication
 - no non-repudiation!


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SSL/TLS in more detail

- “Record layer” protocol
 - fragmentation
 - compression (not in practice)
 - cryptographic security:
 - encryption → data confidentiality
 - MAC → data authentication [no digital signatures!]
- “Handshake” protocol
 - client and server authentication
 - establish cryptographic keys (for encryption and MAC)
 - negotiation of cryptographic algorithms

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
TLS 1.0 Data Encapsulation Options

Integrity			
key size	144	160	
algorithm options	HMAC-MD5	HMAC-SHA	

mandatory

Confidentiality				
key size	40	56	128	168
algorithm options	RC4_40 RC4_40 DES_CBC_40	DES_CBC	RC4 IDEA_CBC	3DES_EDE_CBC

mandatory



RFC 3268: AES Ciphersuites for TLS 06/2002

CipherSuite	Key Exchange	Certificate Type
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA	RSA	RSA
TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA	DH_DSS	DSS
TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA	DH_RSA	RSA
TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA	DHE_DSS	DSS
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA	DHE_RSA	RSA
TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA	DH_anon	
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA	RSA	RSA
TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA	DH_DSS	DSS
TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA	DH_RSA	RSA
TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA	DHE_DSS	DSS
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA	DHE_RSA	RSA
TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA	DH_anon	

TLS 1.1

RFC 4346 April 2006

Limited employment in 2013

- Makes RSA with 3DES the mandatory cipher suite
 - TLS 1.1: TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
 - TLS 1.0: TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
- Provides several fixes, including
 - for the Rogaway and Vaudenay CBC attacks and the 2011 BEAST attack
 - for the Vaudenay, Boneh-Brumley, and Klima-Pokorny-Rosa attacks

TLS 1.2

RFC 5246 - August 2008

- reduces dependency on MD5 and SHA-1
- add support for authenticated encryption
- add AES ciphersuites


SSL/TLS: security services

SSL/TLS only provides:

- entity authentication
- data confidentiality
- data authentication

SSL/TLS does not provide:


- non-repudiation
- unobservability (identity privacy)
- protection against traffic analysis
- secure many-to-many communications (multicast)
- security of the end-points (but relies on it!)



SSL/TLS: security ?

- SSL/TLS offers an adequate security level but it is a very complex protocol
- TLS 1.x is the result of a public reviewing process: several problems have been identified in earlier versions (SSL 2.0/3.0) and have been solved
- In 2013: limited deployment of 1.1 and almost none of 1.2

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SSL/TLS: evaluation


Old problems

- bad implementation; e.g., random number generation
- PKCS#1 attack is patched (use other padding scheme: OAEP; server error messages should contain less information)
- version / cipher suite roll back attempts now patched (due to backward compatibility; disable export algorithms if possible)

Remaining problems

- traffic analysis: e.g., length of ciphertext might reveal useful info
- PKI issues: revocation, root keys, certificate parsing,...
- web spoofing and phishing
- what if the user does not know that a particular website has to use SSL/TLS (solution HSTS - **HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS)**: mandate that you interact with particular servers using https/TLS only)
- plenty of known plaintext (both SSL/TLS and HTTP related)

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TLS Renegotiation attack

[Marsh Ray 9 November 2009]

- Cipher suite can be renegotiated dynamically throughout the session
 - Negotiation and renegotiation look the same
- Person-In-The-Middle can inject (plaintext) traffic in a protected session as if it came from a client
 - establishes an unauthenticated session with a server
 - proxies another authenticated session between the client victim and the same server
 - triggers a renegotiation
 - server: last message received from attacker prior to renegotiation is attached to first message received from client after renegotiation

TLS renegotiation indication extension
RFC 5746 - February 2010

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Implementation attacks


Debian-OpenSSL incident [13 May 2008]

<https://cseweb.ucsd.edu/~hovav/dist/debiankey.pdf>

- Weak key generation: only 32K keys
 - easy to generate all private keys collisions
- Between 13-17 May 2008
280 bad keys out of 40K (0.6%)
- Revocation problematic

[[@_...]]	IN THE RUSH TO CLEAN UP THE DEBIAN-OPENSSL FIASCO, A NUMBER OF OTHER MAJOR SECURITY HOLES HAVE BEEN UNCOVERED:
[[@_...]]	AFFECTED SYSTEM SECURITY PROBLEM
[[@_...]]	FEDORA CORE VULNERABLE TO CERTAIN DECODER RINGS
[[@_...]]	XANDROS (SEE FC) GIVES ROOT ACCESS IF ASKED IN SPEAK VOICE
[[@_...]]	GENODO VULNERABLE TO FLATTERY
[[@_...]]	OLPC OS VULNERABLE TO JEFF GOLDBLUM'S POWERBOOK
[[@_...]]	SLACKWARE GIVES ROOT ACCESS IF USER SAYS EARTH WORD FOR FRIEND
[[@_...]]	UBUNTU THINS OUT DISTRO IS ACTUALLY JUST ANOTHER VISTA, WITH A FEW CUSTOM TRICKIES


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TLS certificate "NULL" issue.

- [Moxie Marlinspike'09] Black Hat
 - browsers may accept bogus SSL certs
 - CAs may sign malicious certs
- certificate for www.paypal.com/0kuleuven.be will be issued if the request comes from a kuleuven.be admin
- response by PayPal: suspend Moxie's account
 - http://www.theregister.co.uk/2009/10/06/paypal_banishes_ssl_hacker/


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Security in transport layer

- Transparent for application
- Pro: can be used for all TCP-based applications, without modifying them
- Con: authentication is one, but who/what to trust, is important
- Non-repudiation?
- In practice: (partially) integrated in application


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Non-repudiation

- Strictly speaking only if in application, thus not provided by SSL/TLS
- SSL/TLS secures the communication channel, but not the exchanged messages
- SSL/TLS does not use digital signatures in the first place (except for client authentication)
- For electronic business, more advanced security protocols are needed...

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User authentication


First *authentication*, then *authorization* !

SSL/TLS client authentication:

- during handshake, client digitally signs a specific message that depends on all relevant parameters of secure session with server
- software devices, smart cards or USB tokens can be deployed through standardized cryptographic interfaces supported by browsers (Netscape: PKCS#11; MSIE: PC/SC)
- PKCS#12 key container provides software mobility

Usually another mechanism on top of SSL/TLS


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TLS in the future (1)

- TLS 2.0?
- Some possible TLS enhancements, discussed within the IETF TLS WG:
 - RSA-OAEP
 - identity protection [note that this is already indirectly possible by authenticating within a DH_anon session]
 - cipher suites for compression
 - missing cipher suites (not all combinations possible)
- Backward compatibility remains very important because of huge installed base

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TLS in the future (2)

Enhancements proposed in literature


- performance improvements:
 - ‘batching’ [ShachamBoneh’01] and ‘fast-track’ [ShachamBoneh’02]
- user (identity) privacy [PersianoVisconti’00]
- client puzzles to counter denial-of-service attacks [DeanStubblefield’01]
- trust negotiation [Hess et al’02]

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
Network layer security

IPsec, VPN, SSH




IP Security Protocols

- IETF Working Group: *IP Security Protocol (ipsec) Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol*
 - RFC 2401 (PS), 11/98
- *IP Authentication Header (AH)*
 - RFC 2402 (PS), 11/98
- *IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)*
 - RFC 2406 (PS), 11/98
- *Internet Key Exchange (IKE)*
 - RFC 2409 (PS), 11/98
 - Application layer protocol for negotiation of Security Associations (SA) and Key Establishment



- Large and complex..... (48 documents)
- Mandatory for IPv6, optional for IPv4

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- ### IPsec - Security services
- Access control
 - Connectionless integrity
 - Data origin authentication
 - Rejection of replayed packets (a form of partial sequence integrity)
 - Confidentiality
 - Limited traffic flow confidentiality

- ### IPsec - Concepts
- Security features are added as extension headers that follow the main IP header
 - Authentication header (AH)
 - Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) header
 - Security Association (SA)
 - Security Parameter Index (SPI)
 - IP destination address
 - Security Protocol Identifier (AH or ESP)

- ### IPsec - Parameters
- sequence number counter
 - sequence counter overflow
 - anti-replay window
 - AH info (algorithm, keys, lifetimes, ...)
 - ESP info (algorithms, keys, IVs, lifetimes, ...)
 - lifetime
 - IPsec protocol mode (tunnel or transport)
 - path MTU (maximum transmission unit)

IKE Algorithm Selection Mandatory Algorithms

Algorithm Type	IKE v1	IKE v2
Payload Encryption	DES-CBC	AES-128-CBC
Payload Integrity	HMAC-MD5 HMAC-SHA1	HMAC-SHA1
DH Group	768 Bit	1536 Bit
Transfer Type 1 (Encryption)	ENCR_DES_CBC	ENCR_AES_128_CBC
Transfer Type 2 (PRF)	PRF_HMAC_SHA1 [RFC2104]	PRF_HMAC_SHA1 [RFC2104]
Transfer Type 3 (Integrity)	AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96 [RFC2404]	AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96 [RFC2404]

Source: draft-ietf-ipsec-ikev2-algorithms-00.txt, May 2003

- ### IPsec - Modes
- Transport (*host-to-host*)
 - ESP: encrypts and optionally authenticates IP payload, but not IP header
 - AH: authenticates IP payload and selected portions of IP header
 - Tunnel (*between security gateways*)
 - after AH or ESP fields are added, the entire packet is treated as payload of new outer IP packet with new outer header
 - used for VPN

IPsec - AH Transport mode

- Security Parameters Index: identifies SA
- Sequence number: anti-replay
- Integrity Check Value: data authentication using HMAC-SHA-1-96 or HMAC-MD5-96

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IPsec - AH Tunnel mode

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IPsec - ESP header

- Security Parameters Index: identifies SA
- Sequence number: anti-replay
- Encrypted payload data: data confidentiality using DES, 3DES, RC5, IDEA, CAST, Blowfish
- Padding: required by encryption algorithm (additional padding to provide traffic flow confidentiality)
- Integrity Check Value : data authentication using HMAC-SHA-1-96 or HMAC-MD5-96

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IPsec - ESP Transport mode

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IPsec - ESP Tunnel mode

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IPsec: Key management

- RFCs 2407, 2408, and 2409
- Manual
- Automated
 - procedure / framework
 - Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP), RFC 2408 (PS)
 - key exchange mechanism: Internet Key Exchange (IKE)
 - Oakley: DH + cookie mechanism to thwart clogging attacks
 - SKEME


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IPsec: Key management

- IKE defines 5 exchanges
 - Phase 1: establish a secure channel
 - Main mode
 - Aggressive mode
 - Phase 2: negotiate IPSEC security association
 - Quick mode (only hashes, PRFs)
 - Informational exchanges: status, new DH group
- based on 5 generic exchanges defined in ISAKMP
- cookies for anti-clogging


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
IPsec: Key management

- protection suite (negotiated)
 - encryption algorithm
 - hash algorithm
 - authentication method:
 - preshared keys, DSA, RSA, encrypted nonces
 - Diffie Hellman group: 5 possibilities

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IKE - Main Mode with Digital Signatures




K derived from $\text{master} = \text{prf}(N_i || N_r, g^{xy})$
 $\text{SIG}_i = \text{Signature on } H(\text{master}, g^i || g^r || \dots || ID_r)$

$\text{SIG}_r = \text{Signature on } H(\text{master}, g^r || g^i || \dots || ID_i)$

H is equal to prf or the hash function tied to the signature algorithm (all inputs are concatenated)


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IKE - Main Mode with Digital Signatures

- mutual entity authentication
- mutual implicit and explicit key authentication
- mutual key confirmation
- joint key control
- identity protection
- freshness of keying material
- perfect forward secrecy of keying material
- non-repudiation of communication
- cryptographic algorithm negotiation


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IKE v2 - RFC Dec 2005

- IKEv1 implementations incorporate additional functionality including features for NAT traversal, legacy authentication, and remote address acquisition, not documented in the base documents
- Goals of the IKEv2 specification include
 - to specify all that functionality in a single document
 - to simplify and improve the protocol, and to fix various problems in IKEv1 that had been found through deployment or analysis
- IKEv2 preserves most of the IKEv1 features while redesigning the protocol for efficiency, security, robustness, and flexibility


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IKE v2 Initial Handshake (1/2)

- Alice and Bob negotiate cryptographic algorithms, mutually authenticate, and establish a session key, creating an IKE-SA
- Usually consists of two request/response pairs
 - The first pair negotiates cryptographic algorithms and does a Diffie-Hellman exchange
 - The second pair is encrypted and integrity protected with keys based on the Diffie-Hellman exchange


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IKE v2 Initial Handshake (2/2)

- Second exchange
 - divulge identities
 - prove identities using an integrity check based on the secret associated with their identity (private key or shared secret key) and the contents of the first pair of messages in the exchange
 - establish a first IPsec SA (“child-SA”) is during the initial IKE-SA creation


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IPsec Overview

- much better than previous alternatives
- IPsec documents hard to read
- vommittee design: too complex
 - ESP in Tunnel mode with authenticated encryption probably sufficient
 - simplify key management
 - clarify cryptographic requirements
- ...and thus difficult to implement (securely)
- **avoid encryption without data authentication**



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VPN?

- Virtual Priate Network
- Connects a private network over a public network.
- Connection is secured by tunneling protocols.
- The nature of the public network is irrelevant to the user.
- It appears as if the data is being sent over the private network.


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
VPN - Common use

- Remote user access over the Internet
- Connecting networks over the Internet
- Connection computers over an intranet

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Remote user access over the Internet



- You can use existing local Internet connections.
- No need for long distance connections

The diagram shows a remote user's computer on the left connected via a 'Dedicated Link to ISP' to an 'ISP' server. A dashed line labeled 'Virtual Private Network' connects the ISP to a 'Corporate Hub' server on the right, which is also connected via a 'Dedicated Link to ISP'. The connection between the ISP and the Corporate Hub is shown as passing through the 'Internet' cloud.

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Connecting networks over the Internet

- You can use existing local Internet connections.
- No need for long distance connections or leased lines

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Connecting computers over an intranet

- Provides easy client access to secured or hidden networks within the corporate network

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VPN - Basic requirements

- User authentication and user authorization
- Data authentication and data confidentiality
- Key management
- Encapsulation
 - data of private network is encapsulated in packets suited for transmission over the public network. (tunneling protocol)
- Address management
 - assign a client's address on the private net

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Tunneling

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Final remarks

Some observations

- IPSec is really transparent, SSL/TLS only conceptually, but not really in practice
- SSH, PGP: stand-alone applications, immediately and easy to deploy and use
- Network security: solved in principle
- Electronic commerce security: more is needed!

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More information (1)

- William Stallings, *Cryptography and Network Security - Principles and Practice*, Fifth Edition, 2010
- N. Doraswamy, D. Harkins, *IPSec (2nd Edition)*, Prentice Hall, 2003 (outdated)
- Erik Rescorla, *SSL and TLS: Designing and Building Secure Systems*, Addison-Wesley, 2000.
- IETF web site: www.ietf.org
 - e.g., IETF-TLS Working Group
<http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/tls-charter.html>

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More information (2)

- Jon C. Snader, *VPNs Illustrated: Tunnels, VPNs, and IPsec*, Addison-Wesley, 2005
- Sheila Frankel, *Demystifying the IPsec Puzzle*, Artech House Computer Security Series, 2001
- Anup Gosh, *E-Commerce Security, Weak Links, Best Defenses*, Wiley, 1998
- Rolf Oppliger, *Security Technologies for the World Wide Web*, Artech House Computer Security Series 1999
- W3C Security (incl WWW Security FAQ)
<http://www.w3.org/Security/>

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